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Abstract 
 
Institutions are an important means for fostering prosocial behaviors, but in many contexts their 
scope is limited and they govern only a subset of all socially desirable acts. We study 
experimentally how the presence and nature of an institution that enforces prosocial behavior in 
one domain affects behavior in a similar but unregulated domain. Groups play two identical 
public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. The presence of an 
institution in one game generally enhances cooperation in the other game, thus documenting a 
positive spillover effect. These indirect spillover effects are economically substantial, amounting 
up to 30 to 40 percent of the direct effect of institutions. In addition, we find evidence for 
sequential spillover effects, meaning that behavior is affected by the institution even after it is 
removed. We also observe that institutions enhance prosocial preferences and beliefs about 
others’ prosocial behavior, even toward strangers, suggesting that both factors are drivers of the 
observed spillover effects. We further explore other aspects influencing spillover effects, 
including characteristics of an institution, such as whether it is exogenously imposed or 
endogenously determined. 
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1 Introduction
The success of any society is largely determined by the formal and informal institu-
tions (e.g., laws and norms) that govern behavior (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). These
institutions are often in place to overcome social dilemmas—such as public goods pro-
vision, environmental protection and tax compliance—in which individual members’
incentives are not aligned with what is best for the society at large.
An important aspect of most institutions is that they are limited in scope, in the sense
that they cannot enforce desired behavior beyond their limits. It is however possible that
institutions exhibit spillover effects and thus indirectly affect behavior in areas where
they do not directly apply. Therefore, the overall effectiveness of an institution for
fomenting socially beneficial behavior depends not only on how it encourages those
behaviors that are subject to the institution, but also on how it affects those behaviors
beyond its scope.
Examples of institutions with limited scope can be found in many areas. In tax en-
forcement, some sources of income or wealth are quite easily monitored—and therefore
subject to the relevant enforcement institutions—whereas for other forms of income the
tax authority has to rely largely on voluntary reporting. In the environmental area,
some measures by governments directly restrict consumers’ choices (e.g., energy sav-
ing through regulation) while changes in other domains (e.g., littering behavior) are
more difficult to enforce. In organizational contexts, managers can enforce cooperation
among team members in tasks that are easily monitored (e.g., a specific teaching load
for faculty of an academic department) but cannot similarly control cooperative behav-
ior in other domains, such as “good citizenship.” Therefore, understanding the extent to
which institutions foster or deter people’s voluntary compliance with rules in domains
beyond the institutions’ scope is important for positive economics and policy.
In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to provide evidence on whether en-
forcement of pro-social behaviors by an institution in one domain spills over to another
closely-related domain ungoverned by any institution. In addition, we explore whether
there are sequential spillover effects in the sense that behavior is affected even after the
institution is removed and whether the institution affects own preferences and beliefs
about others’ behavior. The latter will provide a clue regarding the mechanism behind
potential spillover effects.1 More precisely, to explore the first question we conducted
laboratory experiments in which subjects simultaneously play two linear public goods
games, within fixed four-person groups, repeatedly for 20 periods. In each period and
1We use experiments because this allows us to make causal statements about spillover effects of in-
stitutions. For correlational evidence of a relationship between institutions and pro-social behaviors, see
Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter (2008); Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, McElreath, and Gintis
(2001); Fisman and Miguel (2007).
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in each of the two games, every group member has an endowment of 20, which can be
contributed to the group. Contributions are doubled and then redistributed among all
four group members.
In a baseline “no institution” treatment, behavior is not governed by any enforce-
ment mechanism in either game. That is, subjects can freely choose their public-good
contributions and free-riding in both games is a dominant strategy for narrowly selfish
agents. In the other two treatments, one of the two games is monitored by an institu-
tion (“PGG Rule”), while the other is not (“PGG No Rule”). The specific institution
in our experiment corresponds to a central authority that punishes subjects who con-
tribute less than a specified amount, the Minimum Contribution Requirement (MCR),
with forfeiture of all income in that period from the respective game.2
Whether spillovers of institutions exist and how strong they are may depend on the
origin of the institution. For example, it has been found that democratically chosen
institutions are more effective in fostering cooperation than exogenously imposed ones
(Dal Bo´, Foster, and Putterman, 2010; Kamei, 2016; Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher, 2010;
Tyran and Feld, 2006). By extension, this may also hold for spillovers of institutions.
We therefore implement treatments in which we vary the origin of the institution. In the
“exogenous institution” treatment, the MCR in “PGG Rule” is exogenously imposed
and set to the full endowment of 20. In the “endogenous institution” treatment, the
MCR is determined democratically, through unanimous consensus on a minimal MCR
level.3
In our analysis, we distinguish between the direct effects of an institution and spillover
effects. The former refer to the change in contributions brought about by the institution
in the game where it applies (“PGG Rule”). The latter refer to the change in contribu-
tions brought about by the institution in the game where it does not apply (“PGG No
Rule”). Both effects are measured relative to contributions observed in the “no institu-
tion” treatment.
To explore sequential spillover effects and to learn about potential mechanisms un-
derlying spillovers, we elicit contribution behavior, preferences for conditional coop-
eration and beliefs about others’ cooperation at three points in time and with respect
to different reference groups, in all three treatments. First, before the 20 periods of
the public goods games described above, subjects play a one-shot public goods game
without any institution, where we elicit subjects’ contribution behavior, cooperative
preferences and beliefs about other subjects’ cooperation, using randomly chosen sub-
jects as the reference group. Second, immediately after the 20 periods of the repeated
2This mechanism is similar to the minimum contribution mechanism studied by Keser, Marksta¨dter,
and Schmidt (2017).
3Moreover, under the specific mechanism we use, which we describe in more detail later, the unique
strict subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the voting stage is to select the same institution as the one
exogenously imposed in our other treatment, with the MCR of full contributions.
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public good game, we again measure behavior, preferences and beliefs in the same way
with respect to the “partners” with whom subjects have just interacted. Thereafter, these
measures are elicited once more with respect to an unfamiliar group of “strangers.”
Before previewing our results, we note that there are many possible ways in which
one could investigate how institutional control spills over to influence unregulated be-
haviors. For instance, there exist several possible target behaviors and institutional fea-
tures. One could investigate a context where the same people interact under the control
of the institution and outside of it—as in our experiment and in our motivating examples
regarding tax compliance and workplace regulations—or where the regulated and un-
regulated behaviors involve interactions with different people. In designing our study
we prioritized simplicity, where possible, in order to create a foundation upon which
it is straightforward to build more complex features. Of course, such design choices
limit what one can say about the extent to which any observed spillover effects apply to
other contexts with different characteristics. On the other hand, investigating important
complex questions is rarely successfully completed in a single study. Moreover, by ex-
ploring varying characteristics of institutions in our study and by measuring preferences
and beliefs we begin to shed light on the mechanisms underlying spillover effects.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Both the “exogenous institution”
treatment and “endogenous institution” treatment exhibit significantly positive direct
effects; that is, both types of institutions strongly increase cooperation in the game
where they apply, meaning that they work as intended. More importantly, regarding
our research questions, both institutions also induce significantly positive spillover ef-
fects. These spillover effects are economically substantial, comparable in magnitude to
roughly 30 to 40 percent of the direct effects. Together, the direct and indirect effects
lead to a substantial increase in welfare relative to the treatment without an institution.
On average, the spillover effects in both treatments with an institution are similar, but
they significantly differ in their dynamics. The spillover effects from the endogenously
adopted institution increase over time, whereas the spillover effects from the exoge-
nously imposed institution show no trend.
Regarding sequential spillovers, we find that the contribution enhancing effect of
an enforcement institution persists even after the institution is removed. That is, in
the one-shot public good game without any institution, played after the 20 rounds of
public good games described above, contributions are significantly higher when there
was previously an institution in place than in the “no institution” treatment. This holds
both when playing against the “partners” subjects had interacted with previously and
“strangers” with whom there was no previous interaction.
With respect to conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ con-
tributions, we also see a clear effect of the presence of an institution. In comparison to
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the “no institution” treatment, in both treatments with an institution, beliefs about oth-
ers’ contributions are higher and preferences for conditional cooperation are stronger,
even after the institution ceases to exist. This result again extends to strangers, with
whom there was no prior interaction. This indicates that the observed spillover effects
are due to institutions impacting both subjects’ own preferences for cooperation and
their beliefs about others’ cooperativeness.
To gain further insight into possible reasons for the different dynamics of spillover
effects between the exogenously imposed and endogenously adopted institutions, we
conducted two further treatments. In the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment, we
use a voting mechanism that facilitates the endogenous implementation of strong in-
stitutions (a MCR of 20 points, i.e., full contributions) from the very beginning. We
achieve this by weakening the unanimity requirement and letting group members only
vote for a MCR of either 0 or 20 points. This allows for a better comparison to the
“exogenous institution” treatment, where the MCR of 20 is exogenously implemented
throughout. Further, we conducted an “exogenous yoked institution” treatment, which
exogenously implemented, in each period, the same MCR that was selected, on average,
in the “endogenous institution” treatment. That is, for example, if in a given period of
the “endogenous institution” treatment the average MCR was 10, then this amount was
exogenously imposed as the MCR in the same period of the “exogenous yoked institu-
tion” treatment. This treatment allows us to identify whether it is the endogeneity of the
MCR that matters for the relatively stronger spillover effect over time observed in the
“endogenous institution” treatment, or whether it is the observed temporal trend of the
MCR levels.
The results of these additional treatments strongly suggest that it is the increasing
trend of the MCR, rather than the endogenous adoption, that yields increasing spillover
effects. In the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment, we observe modest and stable
spillover effects, which do not increase over time despite the endogeneity of the insti-
tution. However, in the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment the spillover effects
increase over time and are statistically indistinguishable from the spillover effects in
the “endogenous institution” treatment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related lit-
erature and develops hypotheses regarding the effect of institutions on behavior beyond
their immediate scope. Section 3 introduces the experimental design of the baseline
and the two main treatments and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 introduces
and presents the results of the two additional treatments. In Section 6 we discuss pos-
sible explanations for our findings and Section 7 concludes and discusses directions for
future research.
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2 Related literature and hypotheses
Prior experimental research in economics demonstrates the effectiveness of institutions
for enforcing high cooperation levels in social dilemma situations (see, e.g., Ostrom,
Walker, and Gardner, 1992; Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2000, for exogenously imposed institu-
tions, and, e.g., Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach, 2006; Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl,
2009, for endogenously adopted institutions). This strand of literature studies insti-
tutions that typically work by changing the monetary incentives for non-cooperative
behavior,4 but ignores potential spillover effects of such institutions.
Our main interest is in how the presence of an effective institution in one domain
potentially extends to domains not governed by the institution. We start from the null
hypothesis that there will be no spillover effects. This null hypothesis is supported un-
der the standard preferences framework of narrow selfishness, whereby selfish players
follow their dominant strategy and contribute zero in in the public good game without
an institution (“PGG No Rule”), independently of the presence or the type of the institu-
tion that governs the regulated public good game (“PGG Rule”).5 The null hypothesis is
also supported irrespective of the specific preference type (e.g., other-regarding prefer-
ences) whenever subjects engage in narrow framing and ignore the presence of another
game when making decisions in one game.
A number of studies suggest the possibility of spillovers across contexts and, there-
fore, that the presence of an institution in one context might affect behavior elsewhere.
For example, a few papers show that having subjects simultaneously play multiple
games can lead them to adopt different strategies than when the games are played inde-
pendently (Bednar, Chen, Liu, and Page, 2012; Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2013).6 There
is also evidence that splitting one public good game into two simultaneously played
games increases subject’s contributions (Bernasconi, Corazzini, Kube, and Mare´chal,
2009). In the case of sequentially played games, studies show that groups that manage
to sustain high efficiency levels in a weakest-link game have higher cooperation rates in
subsequently played prisoner’s dilemma games (Knez and Camerer, 2000), that there
are learning spillovers between strategically similar games (Grimm and Mengel, 2012),
and that there exist only very modest spillovers between competitive and cooperative
games that are played with the same opponents (Cason and Gangadharan, 2013). Fur-
4Institutions can also positively affect cooperation even when they have minimal or no effect on
incentives—as when they create an expectation or obligation to act cooperatively (see, e.g., Ostrom,
Walker, and Gardner, 1992; Galbiati and Vertova, 2008; Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´, 2014).
5For a detailed summary of the theoretical predictions of standard preferences, see Appendix A.1.
6Relatedly, McCarter, Samek, and Sheremeta (2014) find that pro-social behavior is stronger when two
simultaneously played public goods games are played with different groups than when they are played with
identical groups and Falk, Fischbacher, and Ga¨chter (2013) report a small behavioral spillover between two
public goods games when played in overlapping neighborhoods.
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thermore, Cason, Savikhin, and Sheremeta (2012) find behavioral spillovers between
minimum- and median-effort coordination games when they are played sequentially,
but not when they are played simultaneously.
Perhaps the closest paper to ours is an experiment by Cassar, D’Adda, and Gros-
jean (2014), who study how behavior in a one-shot trust game is affected by having
earlier experienced one of two forms of sanctioning in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game with an outside option, designed to represent a market trading context with moral
hazard. They find that the institution which induces more cooperative behavior in the
prisoner’s dilemma game also yields more trusting and trustworthy behavior in the sub-
sequent trust game than the other, less effective institution. However, they cannot iden-
tify the strength of spillovers, as they do not provide a comparison with a baseline in
which there is no institution.
These studies all address related questions regarding how behavior in a particular
game is influenced by experience in other games. In contrast, our study directly in-
vestigates how an institution that partially regulates a set of desirable actions affects
behavior in the remaining set of closely related actions that are unregulated. Moreover,
our study investigates such spillovers both while the institution is active and after it
ceases to have any effect and explores, separately, its effects on preferences and beliefs.
Several theoretical arguments suggest that institutions can affect cooperative behav-
ior in the unregulated “PGG No Rule” through an effect on preferences for cooperation
and through an effect on beliefs about others’ cooperativeness. In the following, we
summarize these arguments and the respective empirical evidence. As a complement
to this discussion, Table 1 presents one way of organizing some of the possible mecha-
nisms.
One line of research argues that institutional features can create a crowding out
or crowding in of intrinsic motivations (for survey articles, see Frey and Jegen, 2001;
Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011; Bowles and Polanı´a-Reyes, 2012). If institutions
interact with intrinsic preferences, this interaction may spill over and influence a per-
son’s behavior even in domains in which the institution is not active (Frey, 1993). For
example, exogenous control of one’s behavior may compromise a sense of authority,
thereby, through control aversion, leading to resistance against the behaviors an insti-
tution is attempting to foment (Deci, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Deci, Koestner, and
Ryan, 1999; Belot and Schro¨der, 2016). While such resistance is not possible in do-
mains that are regulated by the institution, it can manifest itself in domains beyond the
scope of the institution, creating negative spillover effects. It also implies that an en-
dogenously chosen institution, where no exogenous control is exerted, might diminish
the degree of crowding out.
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Table 1: Overview of potential spillover effects through preference and belief channels
Positive spillover effect Negative spillover effect
Preference
channels
Expressive function of law
(see, e.g., Sunstein, 1996; Pos-
ner, 1997; Cooter, 1998)
a) Laws allow to signal law-
abiding type (endo=exo)
(see, e.g., Benabou and Tirole,
2011)
b) Laws signal social norms
and people have a preference to
follow social norms (endo>exo)
(see, e.g., Elster, 1989; Lo´pez-
Pe´rez, 2008)
Control aversion
Involuntary exogenous control
(exo>endo)
(see, e.g., Deci, 1975; Deci and
Ryan, 1985; Deci, Koestner, and
Ryan, 1999)
Pure altruism
Others’ contributions replace
own contribution (endo=exo)
(see, e.g., Bernheim, 1986;
Andreoni, 1988)
Belief
channels
Expressive function of law
c) Laws provide a focal point
(endo=exo)
(see, e.g., Cooter, 1998)
Signal of others’ behavior
Necessity of and votes for insti-
tutions signal weak prosociality
(endo>exo)
(see, e.g., Sliwka, 2007)
Notes: (endo>exo) and (exo>endo) mean that a stronger effect is predicted in respectively
the “endogenous institution” treatment and the “exogenous institution” treatment. (endo=exo)
means that no difference in the effect is predicted across treatments with an institution.
Models of pure altruism suggest that people desire certain levels of public good
provision and are indifferent whether it is provided through their own contribution or
those of others (Bernheim, 1986; Andreoni, 1988). Therefore, such models suggest
that an institution enforcing contributions in “PGG Rule” may crowd out voluntary
contributions to “PGG No Rule”, one-to-one.
Conversely, institutions may increase people’s intrinsic willingness to act proso-
cially through the “expressive function of laws” (Sunstein, 1996; Posner, 1997; Cooter,
1998; Benabou and Tirole, 2011). First, individuals might like to signal their law-
abiding type to themselves and others. Such signaling is facilitated when institutions
clearly stipulate which rules are to be followed. Second, laws can also express so-
cial norms and individuals may be motivated by a desire to follow them (Elster, 1989;
Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2008; Krupka and Weber, 2013). Empirically, Peysakhovich and Rand
(2016) demonstrate that behavioral norms may be shaped by experience. They show
that creating either a “defection norm” or a “cooperation norm” in prisoners’ dilemma
games differentially affects the tendency to punish uncooperative behaviors in subse-
quent games. In a similar vein, d’Adda, Capraro, and Tavoni (2017) provide evidence
that some policies affect behavior even after they have been faded out. For our treat-
ments, these channels suggest that the imposition of a positive MCR in one game (“PGG
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Rule”) may signal a social norm or law, with which subjects may prefer to comply even
in the unregulated game (“PGG No Rule”). This implies that we should observe positive
spillover effects. These effects may be stronger in the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment, where the MCR is implemented by a unanimous voting process, thus creating a
stronger social norm.
An institution may affect cooperative behavior in the unregulated “PGG No Rule”
also through beliefs about others’ cooperativeness. In public good games, many people
act as conditional cooperators—i.e., they reciprocate positively to their beliefs about
others’ contributions (Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010). Therefore, if institutions impact beliefs about
others’ cooperativeness, this would provide a channel through which cooperative be-
havior is affected even beyond the scope of the institution (Jehiel, 2005). Norms and
laws may provide a focal point and, thus, positively affect beliefs about others’ contri-
butions (Cooter, 1998). Alternatively, observing votes for a strong institution may foster
pessimistic beliefs about group members’ trust and trustworthiness and, thus, also about
their contributions (Sliwka, 2007). Moreover, the effect on beliefs may differ between
the “endogenous institution” treatment and the “exogenous institution” treatment, as
there is evidence that people reciprocate others’ cooperation only when such coopera-
tion is voluntary and intentional (Cettolin and Riedl, 2014). Hence, changes in beliefs
may create spillover effects in either direction and they may differ across treatments.
In sum, several theoretical arguments and the existing empirical studies suggest that
institutions could influence behavior in unregulated environments through an effect on
preferences for cooperation and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness. Table 1 sum-
marizes these arguments, the respective direction of their prediction, and whether the
nature of the institution matters.7 However, whether such spillover effects indeed occur,
whether they are positive or negative, and whether they operate through preferences or
beliefs is an open empirical question.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of five parts. We start with describing Part II, which investi-
gates the extent to which an institution that monitors and enforces cooperation in one
7In addition, there are other theoretical models which predict a spillover effect, but whose exact mecha-
nism is not present in out experiment. For example, Jackson and Acemoglu (2017) describe the interaction
between laws and social norms. They show that excessively strong laws, i.e., those that are in stark contrast
with prevailing social norms, can backfire and lead to less law-abiding behavior. In contrast, moderate laws
can change social norms if strengthened incrementally. While our experiment also varies whether institu-
tions are strengthened over time or strong and stable from the beginning, the mechanism that drives the
theoretical predictions, namely cooperation with law enforcement through whistleblowing, is not present
in our experiment.
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environment spills over to an identical environment where the institution does not apply.
The treatments in Part II vary the way in which the institution is implemented in order
to distinguish between spillovers that are generated by endogenously adopted versus ex-
ogenously imposed institutions. Parts I, III and IV are preference and belief elicitation
stages that help to identify whether institutions have persistent influence on subjects’
beliefs, preferences or both. These parts are identical across all treatments. Finally, in
Part V, we measure various individual characteristics. Table 2 provides an overview of
the experimental design.
Table 2: Overview of experimental design
Part I Preference and belief elicitation
(randomly determined group)
Part II 20 periods of “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”
(new group - absolute stranger matching)
No Exogenous Endogenous
institution institution institution
Part III Preference and belief elicitation
(same group as in Part II)
Part IV Preference and belief elicitation
(new group - absolute stranger matching)
Part V Individual characteristics
3.1 The Game
We use a linear public goods game as our workhorse, whose basic structure is constant
across all parts and treatments. Each of four group members (n = 4) is endowed with
20 points (w = 20) and can decide how many points to keep for him- or herself and
how many to contribute to a public good. The sum of points contributed to the public
good is doubled and equally distributed among all members of the group (implying a
marginal per capita return of 0.5). Thus, given the contribution of all group members
(g = (g1, ..., g4)) the material payoff of group member i in the public goods game
equals
pii(g) = 20− gi + 0.5
4∑
j=1
gj .
In the following, we first describe Part II before explaining Parts I, III, IV, and V in
more detail.
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3.2 Part II: Treatment stage
At the beginning of Part II, subjects were randomly matched into four-person groups
consisting of subjects who had not interacted previously. Within Part II, subjects played
repeatedly, for 20 periods, with the same group of subjects (partner matching). Part II
differs between three treatments, “no institution”, “exogenous institution”, and “en-
dogenous institution.”
3.2.1 “No institution” treatment
In each period of the “no institution” treatment, subjects simultaneously played two
public good games with the same group members. The parameters of both games are as
specified before. That is, in each game subjects were endowed with 20 points and were
free to contribute to each public good any integer value between zero and 20 points.
The two public goods games were displayed next to each other on the same computer
screen. Henceforth, these games are called “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”.8
Before subjects made their contribution decisions in the two public good games,
they were asked to indicate, separately and in each period, their belief about the average
contribution of the other three group members in the two games. To avoid hedging,
belief elicitation was not incentivized monetarily, but subjects were asked to enter their
best estimates.9 Thereafter, subjects made their contributions to the public goods. They
entered and submitted them in the two games separately and decided themselves about
the timing of their contributions to either game. Thus, one period in our experiment
may be thought of resembling a period of time (e.g., a day), in which one has to fulfill
certain tasks—some monitored, others not—and for which one can decide when and in
what order to complete these tasks.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the contributions of all
group members to both public goods and their payoffs from both games. Contributions
were displayed in descending order and it was not possible to identify which member
of the group contributed which number of points to the public goods in the two games.
A subject’s total payoff in each period consisted of the sum of the payoffs of the two
games. At the end of the experiment, one of the 20 periods was randomly selected for
payment. The total payoff in the randomly selected period was multiplied by 20, so that
it counted for all 20 periods.10
8Obviously, in the “no institution” treatment there was no “rule” in any game. In the experiment, the
two games were neutrally labeled as “Task Left” and “Task Right” in all treatments.
9Ga¨chter and Renner (2010) find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels
in repeated public goods games than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. In this part of
the experiment we are mainly interested in behavior and, therefore, decided against incentivizing belief
elicitation.
10Azrieli, Chambers, and Healy (2017) show that paying one randomly chosen period is incentive com-
patible when assuming only monotonicity.
10
3.2.2 “Exogenous institution” treatment
We implemented two treatments with institutions. In both treatments, the setup of “PGG
No Rule” is identical to the “no institution” treatment—i.e. subjects were free to con-
tribute any integer amount between 0 and 20 points to the public good. The payoff
structure of “PGG Rule”, however, is affected by the treatments. In particular, in each
period “PGG Rule” is governed by an institution that monitors the group members’ con-
tributions in that game and punishes those members that contribute less than a certain
minimum contribution requirement (henceforth MCR). Specifically, the income from
“PGG Rule” of any group member who contributes at least as many points to the group
account as specified by the MCR is unaffected by the institution, whereas any group
member who contributes fewer points to the group account than the MCR level forfeits
any income from “PGG Rule” in that period.
In the “exogenous institution” treatment, the MCR in “PGG Rule” is fixed at 20,
i.e., the entire endowment for that game. In each period, subjects see the MCR on
their screen when making contribution decisions. The payoff from “PGG Rule” in the
“exogenous institution” treatment is thus determined as follows:
pii(g) =

20− gi + 0.5 ·
4∑
j=1
gj if gi = 20,
0 if gi < 20.
(1)
As in the “no institution” treatment the total per-period payoff of each subject is equal
to the sum of the payoffs in “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”.
Note that if one group member is penalized for contributing less than the MCR in
“PGG Rule”, the incomes of the other group members are not affected. Thus, the other
group members still benefit from any contributions made by any group member in “PGG
Rule”. This reflects, for instance, an institution that confiscates part of an individual’s
income as a penalty.
3.2.3 “Endogenous institution” treatment
The “endogenous institution” treatment consists of two stages that are repeated in every
period: an institution formation stage and a contribution stage.
As in the “exogenous institution” treatment, the institution again imposes a MCR on
contributions only in “PGG Rule”. The difference is that, now, the MCR is determined
endogenously in an institution formation stage. That is, instead of facing an exoge-
nously set contribution threshold of 20, in each period each group votes to determine
the MCR for that group. Each member of the group casts a vote for a desired MCR by
specifying an integer value between 0 and 20. Following voting, the lowest contribution
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threshold that was voted for by any group member is implemented as the MCR for that
period. We chose this particular mechanism because it imposes a unanimity require-
ment, in the sense that a particular MCR level is adopted only if everyone voted for at
least that level. Thus, the endogenously implemented MCR has the support of all group
members.
At the end of the institution formation stage, group members were informed about
the implemented MCR for that period and the votes that were cast. Votes were displayed
in descending order and it was not possible to identify which member of the group voted
for which MCR.
After subjects were informed about the MCR, but before they made their contribu-
tion decisions, they were asked to indicate their belief about the other group members’
average contribution to the two public goods games.
The contribution stage is identical to the “exogenous institution” treatment, with the
only difference that in each period the MCR is now the one group members agreed upon
in the institution formation stage. The payoff from “PGG Rule” in the “endogenous
institution” treatment is thus determined as follows:
pii(g) =

20− gi + 0.5 ·
4∑
j=1
gj if gi ≥ MCR,
0 if gi < MCR.
(2)
Payoffs and feedback were identical to those in the “exogenous institution” treat-
ment, with the additional information of the realized MCR in that period. The rules and
procedure for payout were the same as in the other treatments.
3.3 Part I, III & IV: Preference and belief elicitation stages
We elicited unconditional contributions, cooperative preferences and beliefs about oth-
ers’ cooperativeness at three points in the experiment (see Table 2). First, in Part I
immediately before Part II, second, in Part III immediately after the preceding part,
with respect to the identical group from Part II and, thereafter, third, with respect to a
new group of randomly-selected participants with whom subjects had never interacted
before (Part IV).
In Parts I, III and IV, subjects played a one-shot four-person linear public good game
with endowments of 20 and no institution. In each of these parts, all subjects made an
unconditional contribution decision. Further, to separate beliefs and preferences, in each
part, there were two further stages: a belief-elicitation stage in which we elicited beliefs
about how much others would unconditionally contribute in the public good game and
a preference-elicitation stage in which we elicited contribution decisions conditional on
others’ contributions.
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In the belief-elicitation stage we used the incentive compatible Most Likely Inter-
val elicitation rule (MLI) introduced by Schlag and van der Weele (2015). Specifically,
subjects were asked to provide two integer values as the upper and the lower bound of
the range of values that they believed would contain the actual average unconditional
contribution of the other three group members (rounded to the nearest integer). Subjects
earned 20 if they specified a range consisting of only one number (i.e., a point predic-
tion) and that number was equal to the actual rounded average contribution of the other
group members. For each unit that the provided range increased in width, a subject’s
potential earnings decreased by one point. Hence, if a subject provided an interval of
width 10, then the subject earned 10 if the interval contained the actual realized average.
Regardless of the width of the interval provided, subjects earned nothing if the actual
average contribution of others was outside the specified range. Thus, subjects were in-
centivized to reveal their true beliefs as precisely as possible. The width of the range
they provided is a measure of uncertainty regarding their beliefs.
In the preference-elicitation stage, we employ the strategy method for eliciting con-
ditional contribution profiles (Selten, 1967; Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr, 2001). Af-
ter having indicated their unconditional contribution to the public good, subjects were
asked to specify how much they would contribute for each of the 21 possible levels of
average contribution (rounded to integers) of the other group members. This procedure
has been used in several studies to elicit conditional cooperation preferences that are
independent of beliefs.
After all subjects made their unconditional and conditional contribution decisions,
three of the four group members were randomly selected to implement their specified
unconditional contributions. For the remaining group member, the conditional contribu-
tion decision was implemented, given the rounded average of the other group members’
unconditional contributions. Subjects were paid their earnings for each of Parts I, III,
and IV.
3.4 Part V: Individual characteristics
In Part V, we collected other individual characteristics. First, we elicited cognitive abil-
ity using the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) and rule-following propensity
via the rule-following task introduced in Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2017). In the
rule-following task, subjects saw, on their computer screen, two baskets, one yellow and
one blue, and a ball. They were told that they would earn 2 ECU if they placed the ball
in the yellow basket and 1 ECU if they placed the ball in the blue basket. However, they
were also told that the rule is to place the ball in the blue basket. This procedure was
repeated for 30 balls. The number of balls placed in the blue basket is informative about
a subject’s propensity to follow an arbitrary rule at the expense of personal payoffs.
13
Additionally, we asked subjects a series of questions in order to elicit their attitudes
towards risk, intertemporal discounting, altruism, reciprocity and trust. These questions
were English translations of the ones included in several waves of the German Socio
Economic Panel (SOEP) survey.11
At the very end of the experiment, subjects were asked about their age, gender,
and academic major. At that point they were also asked to provide their reasoning
when making the contribution decision for “PGG No Rule” and, in the “endogenous
institution” treatment, their reasoning when making the voting decision for the MCR.
3.5 General procedures
Before subjects entered the lab, they randomly drew a place card that specified at which
computer terminal to sit. Subjects found paper copies of the consent form and the
instructions for Part I at their assigned computer terminals. Subjects were informed
that the experiment consists of several parts, but were not informed about the content of
each part. At the beginning of each part, the instructions of that part were read out aloud
to ensure common information regarding the content. The instructions to Part I and
Part II included comprehension questions that had to be answered correctly before the
respective part could begin. The instructions for Part I and the “endogenous institution”
treatment of Part II can be found in Appendix A.4, together with screen shots of the
decision-relevant stages. All sessions were conducted in English.
We conducted six sessions on three consecutive days in November 2014 in Maas-
tricht, Netherlands, with 136 subjects in total and six sessions on three consecutive days
in February 2015 in Zurich, Switzerland, with 136 subjects in total. Treatments were
randomized across sessions and each treatment was run four times, twice in the morning
and twice in the afternoon, twice in Maastricht and twice in Zurich. Each subject partic-
ipated only once. Overall, 92 subjects participated in the “no institution” treatment, 88
subjects in the “exogenous institution” treatment, and 92 subjects in the “endogenous
institution” treatment.
The sessions in Zurich took place at the Laboratory for Behavioral and Experi-
mental Economics of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich and
the sessions in Maastricht took place at the Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Laboratory (BEElab) of the School of Business and Economics at Maastricht Univer-
sity. The experiments were run with the software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007). We
used the software packages “hroot” (Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014) and “ORSEE”
11All questions are reproduced in full in Appendix A.4. The behavioral validity of the risk and intertem-
poral discounting questions was established with incentivized experiments (see Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner, 2011; Vischer, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner, 2013).
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(Greiner, 2015) for recruitment. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich,
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich and Maastricht University.
Sessions lasted about 2.5 hours. Payoffs from the experiment, denominated in
“ECU,” were converted into money at the rate of 65 ECU to AC1 (about $1.25 at the
time of the experiment) in Maastricht and 100 ECU to CHF 3 (about $3.25 at the time
of the experiment) in Zurich. Subjects were paid anonymously at the end of the exper-
iment. On average, subjects earned AC22.52 in Maastricht, with no show-up fee, and
CHF 55.45 in Zurich, which included a show-up fee of CHF 10. The total payoff from
the experiment equaled the sum of the payoffs in the five parts (plus the payment of a
show-up fee in Zurich). For Parts I, III, IV, and V, subjects learned about the outcomes
and their payoffs only at the very end of the experiment, after all decisions were made.
4 Results
In presenting the results, we first explore contribution behavior in Part II, the part of
the experiment during which the repeated two public good games were played and the
treatments were introduced. We then jointly analyze Parts III and IV, to explore if and
how the institutions introduced in Part II affect unconditional contributions in a one-shot
public good game after the institution was removed, as well as cooperative preferences
and beliefs about others’ contributions to the the public good.
Before proceeding, we make a note on behavior, beliefs and preferences measured
in the one-shot game in Part I in the different treatments. Figure 1(a) shows the average
unconditional contributions and average beliefs about others’ contributions and Fig-
ure 1(b) the average conditional cooperation preferences, in the one-shot public good
game. There are almost no differences between treatments for all three measures and
statistical tests confirm that these are not significant.12 This lack of any difference is
expected, as our treatment differences were not introduced until Part II, and shows that
randomization across treatments was successful.
4.1 Part II contributions
In what follows we first report results pertaining to contributions in the two simultane-
ously played repeated public good games. Thereafter, we present the results regarding
direct and spillover effects in the two treatments with institutions.
12These results are from pair-wise treatment comparisons of unconditional contributions (Wilcoxon
rank sum tests, p ≥ 0.750) and pair-wise treatment comparisons of beliefs about others’ contributions
(Wilcoxon rank sum tests, p ≥ 0.346). For comparing conditional cooperation preferences we construct
an aggregate cooperation preference variable by taking the amount a subject decided to contribute, aver-
aged across all possible contributions by others. Pair-wise treatment comparisons of this variable are also
insignificant (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p ≥ 0.401).
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Figure 1: Unconditional contributions, beliefs about others’ contributions and coopera-
tion preferences in Part I.
Figure 2 gives an overview of behavior in the three treatments during Part II. For
each treatment, the figure shows the average contributions to “PGG No Rule” and to
“PGG Rule”, and—in treatments with institutions—the average MCR.13
For the “no institution” treatment, Figure 2(a) shows that contributions to “PGG
No Rule” and “PGG Rule” closely track each other and follow the typical declining
pattern found in standard public good games. Average contributions to “PGG No Rule”
(“PGG Rule”) start at 11.45 (11.60) in the first period and decline steadily to 4.33 (5.23)
in the last period. Averaged over all periods, there are no significant differences in
contributions to “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule” (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p =
0.637).14 Thus, when no institution was present, on average subjects did not behave
systematically differently in the two games. That there was little tendency to contribute
differently between the two games is corroborated by group level data analysis (for
details see Figure A.2(a) in Appendix A.2.2).
Turning to the “exogenous institution” treatment, Figure 2(b) shows that this in-
stitution is—as expected—highly effective in enforcing cooperative behavior in “PGG
Rule”. The MCR of 20 was satisfied by 1753 of 1760 contribution decisions (99.6%),
yielding an average contribution to “PGG Rule” of 19.95 points. Average contributions
to “PGG No Rule” start at 12.16 in the first period, slightly higher than in the “no in-
stitution” treatment, increase subsequently to reach a maximum of 14.53 in the third
period, and thereafter decline steadily to 6.93 in the last period.15
13In the “no institution” treatment, “PGG No Rule” refers to “Task Left” (i.e., the game on the left side
of the subject’s decision screen) and “PGG Rule” to “Task Right” (i.e., the game on the right side of the
subject’s decision screen).
14If not indicated otherwise all statistical tests are two-sided and units of observation are the independent
4-person groups.
15At the group level, almost all groups contribute fully to “PGG Rule”, whereas there is a fair amount
of dispersion in average contributions to “PGG No Rule” (see Figure A.2(b) in Appendix A.2.2).
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Figure 2: Average contributions under “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”, and MCR.
Figure 2(c) shows that, in the “endogenous institution” treatment, groups do not
immediately implement very high MCR’s in the “PGG Rule”. The average implemented
MCR is 7 in the first period, but rises quickly and reaches an average of 17.75 in the
final five periods. With the rise in the MCR, average contributions to “PGG Rule”
increase over time. As in the “exogenous institution” treatment, the MCR in “PGG
Rule” was virtually never violated (it happened only in 2 out of 1840 observations).
Average contributions to “PGG No Rule” start at 11.60 in the first period and remain
between 11.60 and 13.20 until the 20th period, when the end-game effect kicks in and
they decline to 9.27.
An interesting pattern in the “endogenous institution” treatment is that groups fail
to implement very high MCR’s, especially in the beginning, despite the fact that a MCR
of 20 makes full contributions a strictly dominant strategy for all group members. In
the first period of Part II, subjects vote, on average, for a MCR of 13.83 with the largest
proportions voting for MCR’s of 20 (28.26 percent), 15 (17.39 percent), and 10 (11.96
percent).16 The votes for relatively low MCR’s indicate that a sizable fraction of subjects
need to learn that higher MCR’s are beneficial. For instance, in period 1 the actual
average payoff from “PGG Rule” was 32.12 ECU and only 4 out of 92 subjects earned
more than 40 ECU, although a MCR of 20 would guarantee a payoff of 40 ECU.17
16Subjects’ votes in period 1 correlate significantly and positively with their beliefs about group mem-
bers’ contributions in Part I as well as their own unconditional contribution decision in Part I, but not with
their average conditional contributions. Furthermore, female subjects tend to vote for lower MCR’s. All
other independent characteristics show no significant correlation (see Table A.6 in Appendix A.2.3).
17Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Eyster (2017) suggest that subjects underestimate the equilibrium effects of insti-
tutions, which can lead to the demand for suboptimal policies. In our context, this could imply that subjects
fail to realize that a low MCR will generate incentives for others to provide low contributions. However,
subjects’ expected payoffs from “PGG Rule”, given their contributions and their (non-incentivized) beliefs
about the contributions of their group members, from Part I are even lower (31.14 ECU) than their actual
payoff. This also holds for the pivotal voters in period 1, who had no reason to update their beliefs between
their vote and their contribution decision. Hence, at least these pivotal voters knowingly voted for a MCR
that, given their stated beliefs, gave them a suboptimal payoff.
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Figure 3 provides a closer look at the individual voting decisions over the 20 periods
and shows the fraction of votes for a MCR of 20, a MCR between 10 and 19, and a MCR
below 10. The learning effect is clearly visible. While a minority of subjects initially
vote for a MCR of 20, such votes quickly increase in frequency and reach levels of over
80 percent after period 10. On the other hand, in every period, there are always at least
3 subjects (out of 92) who vote for thresholds below 10. Since the voting mechanism
implements the minimal vote as the group’s MCR, such subjects exert disproportionate
influence. For example, in the first period, where 17.39 percent of votes for a MCR of
below 10 translate into 56.52 percent of groups with a MCR of below 10.
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Figure 3: Voting behavior in the “endogenous institution” treatment.
4.2 Direct and spillover effects of institutions
In assessing the overall effectiveness of institutions, we distinguish between direct ef-
fects and spillover effects. Direct effects refer to the change in contributions brought
about by the institution in the game where it applies (“PGG Rule”), relative to the
contributions in the respective game in the “no institution” treatment, where there is
never an institution. Direct effects thus reflect the immediate influence of an institution.
Spillover effects, in contrast, refer to the change in contributions brought about by the
institution in the game where it does not apply (“PGG No Rule”), relative to the contri-
butions in the respective game in the “no institution” treatment. Spillover effects thus
reflect the derived or indirect effectiveness of an institution.
Direct effects. Comparing the contributions in “PGG Rule” across graphs in Figure 2
reveals that the exogenous and endogenous institutions clearly increase contributions
in “PGG Rule” relative to the treatment without an institution. This direct effect is
substantial and significant. Table 3 quantifies the direct effects across all periods as
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well as across periods 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20. In the “exogenous institution”
treatment, the direct effect amounts to 11.12 points (i.e., more than 50 percent of the
endowment) over all periods and varies little over time (between 9.28 in the first five
periods and 12.64 in the last five periods). In the “endogenous institution” treatment,
the direct effect increases over time from 3.48 in the first five periods to 11.02 in the
last five periods, which amounts to an overall effect of 8.12. In both treatments, in all
investigated blocks of periods the increase relative to the “no institution” treatment is
statistically significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p ≤ 0.001).18
Result 1. In both the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment, there are significantly positive direct effects of the institution. In both
treatments, contributions are significantly higher under the presence of an institution
than in the “no institution” treatment where an institution is never present.
Spillover effects. After having established that there are significant direct effects of
institutions, the next question is if these direct effects spill over to the domain where
there is no institution in place. Figure 4 visualizes for both treatments the spillover ef-
fects over time and Table 3 reports them for all periods and for blocks of five periods.
Over all periods, spillover effects are significantly larger than zero in both the “ex-
ogenous institution” treatment and “endogenous institution” treatment (3.38 and 3.12,
respectively; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p = 0.026 and p = 0.047, respectively). There
is no significant difference between the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.856). (We discuss the
apparently different dynamics below.)
The observed spillover effects are not only statistically significant but are also large
in magnitude. Table 3 reports the relative size of the spillover effects defined as the
spillover effect divided by the direct effect. Taken over all periods the relative spillover
effect amounts to 0.30 and 0.38 in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment, respectively. Thus, an institution that directly increases
contributions by 100 percent, in addition increases contributions by at least 30 percent
in the domain beyond its direct control.
Result 2. In both the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment, the presence of an institution that directly increases contributions in
one domain induces a significantly positive spillover effect and, therefore, leads to sig-
nificantly increased contributions in the domain beyond the reach of the institution. In
both treatments, the size of the spillover effect is economically substantial.
18In all statistical tests regarding direct and spillover effects we compare the group averages in Task Left
(“PGG No Rule”) and Task Right (“PGG Rule”) in the “no institution” treatment with those in the respec-
tive tasks in the “exogenous institution” treatment and “endogenous institution” treatment, respectively.
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Table 3: Direct and spillover effect of institutions on contributions in the “ex-
ogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment
Period
All 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20
Direct effect 11.12 9.28 10.31 12.24 12.64
(s.e.) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Exo Spillover effect 3.38 2.54 2.94 4.92 3.12
(N=22) (s.e.) (0.95) (0.83) (1.17) (1.28) (1.12)
[p-value] [0.026] [0.047] [0.073] [0.013] [0.052]
Relative size of 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.40 0.25
spillover effect
Direct effect 8.12 3.48 7.53 10.47 11.02
(s.e.) (0.61) (0.79) (0.83) (0.66) (0.64)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Endo Spillover effect 3.12 1.09 2.46 4.29 4.63
(N=23) (s.e.) (1.02) (0.84) (1.13) (1.32) (1.31)
[p-value] [0.047] [0.386] [0.153] [0.020] [0.013]
Relative size of 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.42
spillover effect
Notes: For each group in the treatments, the direct (spillover) effect equals the difference
between that group’s average contributions to “PGG Rule” (“PGG No Rule”) and the av-
erage contributions of all groups to “PGG Rule” (“PGG No Rule”) in the “no institution”
treatment. p-values are from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the group-level contri-
butions in “PGG Rule” (“PGG No Rule”) of the “exogenous institution” treatment and the
“endogenous institution” treatment, respectively, to contributions in “PGG Rule” (“PGG
No Rule”) in the “no institution” treatment. Relative size of spillover effect is the quotient
of spillover and direct effect.
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Figure 4: Spillover effect in “PGG No Rule”.
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Welfare. Both effects contribute to increased overall welfare. Relative to the “no in-
stitution” treatment, the significant overall welfare gain in the “exogenous institution”
treatment amounts to 14.51 additional points, of which 11.13 are due to the direct effect
and 3.38 are due to the spillover effect (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < 0.001). Similarly,
relative to the “no institution” treatment, the significant overall welfare gain in the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment amounts to 11.30 additional points, of which 8.18 are
due to the direct effect and 3.12 are due to the spillover effect (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p < 0.001).
Result 3. In both treatments, institutions that regulate cooperation in one domain sig-
nificantly increase welfare both directly in the regulated domain and indirectly in the
domain beyond their immediate effect.
Dynamics of spillover effects. We have seen that, taken over all periods, the average
spillover effects do not differ between the “exogenous institution” treatment and the
“endogenous institution” treatment. However, Figure 4 provides some indication that
the dynamics of the spillover effects differ across treatments. Specifically, the spillover
induced by the “endogenous institution” treatment is relatively small in the beginning,
but strongly increases over time, whereas the spillover induced by the “exogenous in-
stitution” treatment does not show a clear trend. Consequently, in comparison to the
“endogenous institution” treatment, the spillover effect is stronger in the “exogenous
institution” treatment in the earlier periods, but weaker towards the end of the 20 peri-
ods.
These different dynamics in spillovers are statistically significant. According to
Spearman rank order correlations the spillover effect in the “exogenous institution”
treatment does not change significantly over time (ρ = 0.344, p = 0.137), whereas
the spillover effect in the “endogenous institution” treatment exhibits a significantly
positive trend (ρ =0.901, p < 0.001). The separate statistics for blocks of five periods
reported in Table 3 draw a similar picture. In the “exogenous institution” treatment the
spillover effect is (marginally) significantly positive in all four blocks (Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests, p ≤ 0.073) and does not change much from periods 1-5 (2.54) to periods
16-20 (3.12). In contrast, in the “endogenous institution” treatment the spillover effect
increases from 1.09 in periods 1-5 to 4.63 in periods 16-20. Moreover, the spillover ef-
fect is not statistically significantly different from zero in the first half of the 20 periods
(Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p ≥ 0.153), but becomes highly significant in the second
half (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p ≤ 0.020).19
19The reported significance and dynamics of direct and spillover effects is corroborated by regression
analysis (see Table A.1 in Appendix A.2.1.)
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Result 4. The dynamics of spillover effects differ between treatments. The spillover ef-
fect from the endogenously adopted institution increases over time, whereas the spillover
effect from the exogenously imposed institutions does not show a trend.
It seems reasonable that the different spillover dynamics in the “exogenous institu-
tion” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment are related to the differences
in the development of the MCR. In the “exogenous institution” treatment, the MCR is
fixed at 20 throughout the experiment, whereas in the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment it increases monotonically from a rather low level in the early periods to close to
20 in the later periods. Indeed, taking group averages over all periods, contributions
to “PGG No Rule” and the MCR in “PGG Rule” are highly correlated (Spearman’s
rank order correlation, ρ = 0.315, p = 0.009).20 This suggests that there is a positive
relationship between the strength of the institution and the spillover effect it creates.21
Decomposing the spillover effects. An important remaining question is whether the
spillover effects in the treatments with an institution stem primarily from free-riders
who do not contribute in the “no institution” treatment starting to contribute positive
amounts, or because subjects who already contribute in the “no institution” treatment
contribute more, or both. We next explore this by studying the spillover effects on the
extensive and intensive margins of contributions.
For each treatment, Figure 5(a) reports the fraction of subjects who contribute a
positive amount in “PGG No Rule”. It shows that there are little differences across
treatments. Averaged over all periods, the frequency of positive contributions is 76.25
20This result is confirmed in regression analysis (see Table A.4 in Appendix A.2.2) that disaggregates
the period-level data within a group. However, the regression results have to be interpreted with caution as,
in the “endogenous institution” treatment, behavior in past periods might both influence the implemented
MCR and contributions to “PGG No Rule”.
21While it is not possible to completely rule out that selection plays a role in such a relationship, we have
evidence that this is not the case. We test for selection effects by looking at two extreme cases of MCR’s for
which we have observations of randomly selected groups and groups that implemented the respective MCR
endogenously. First, in the “endogenous institution” treatment we only consider groups that implemented
a MCR of zero and compare their contributions to groups in the “no institution” treatment, in which there is
also an implicit MCR of zero. We obtain the data for the “endogenous institution” treatment by averaging a
group’s contribution to “PGG No Rule” over all periods in which that group implemented a MCR of zero.
In total, six groups implemented a MCR of zero at least once. We find that contributions in the former
and latter case are not significantly different (average contributions to “PGG No Rule”: 7.64 and 9.15,
respectively; Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.572). Second, we look at the 19 groups in the “endogenous
institution” treatment that implemented a MCR of 20 in some periods and compare their contributions
to the “PGG No Rule” in those periods to the contributions to the “PGG No Rule” in the “exogenous
institution” treatment. The average contributions in the former and the latter case are virtually identical
(12.34 vs. 12.53; Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.875). Hence, at least in these two comparisons, groups
that adopted a MCR endogenously do not appear to behave differently than groups for which that MCR
was exogenously imposed. Another possibility could be that the MCR influences contributions in “PGG
No Rule” because subjects simply imitate their contributions to “PGG Rule” in “PGG No Rule”. However,
we don’t find this to be the case. For a detailed analysis, see Appendix A.2.4.
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percent in the “no institution” treatment, 78.18 percent in the “exogenous institution”
treatment, and 85.76 percent in the “endogenous institution” treatment. The differences
are insignificant between the former two (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.991), while
in the “endogenous institution” treatment the fraction is marginally significantly higher
(Wilcoxon ranksum tests, p = 0.098 and p = 0.108, respectively). The frequencies of
positive contributions exhibit decreasing trends and Spearman’s rank order correlations
show that the trend is similar in all treatments (“no institution” treatment: ρ = −0.903,
“exogenous institution” treatment: ρ = −0.927, “endogenous institution” treatment:
ρ = −0.828; p < 0.001).
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Figure 5: Decision to contribute and level of contribution conditional on positive con-
tribution.
The picture changes when looking at average contributions conditional on hav-
ing contributed a positive amount, shown in Figure 5(b). Averaged over all periods,
contributions are (marginally) significantly higher in the “exogenous institution” treat-
ment (15.64) and the “endogenous institution” treatment (13.91) than in the “no in-
stitution” treatment (11.49) (Wilcoxon ranksum tests, p = 0.001 and p = 0.073, re-
spectively). The difference between the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment is not significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.128).
There is a pronounced difference in the development of average conditional contribu-
tions over time. In the “no institution” treatment contributions decline (Spearman’s
ρ = −0.770, p < 0.001), they appear to be stable in the “exogenous institution” treat-
ment (ρ = −0.179, p = 0.450) and they are increasing in the “endogenous institution”
treatment (ρ = 0.698, p = 0.001).
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A regression analysis corroborates these findings. Table 4 shows the two stages of a
hurdle model. In Stage 1, a Probit regression estimates the effect of treatments, period,
and treatment-period interactions on the decision to contribute. The results show that
both treatments (variables “Exo” and “Endo”) do not have a significant level effect on
the decision to contribute something positive. The variable “Period” has a significantly
negative effect, indicating that the likelihood to contribute a positive amount is decreas-
ing over time in the “no institution” treatment. The trend is the same in the “exogenous
institution” treatment and in the “endogenous institution” treatment, as shown by the
insignificant interaction variables.
Table 4: Decision to contribute and contri-
butions to “PGG No Rule”
Hurdle Hurdle
Stage 1 Stage 2
No (constant) 1.294∗∗∗ 13.213∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.921)
Exo -0.087 3.142∗∗∗
(0.285) (1.069)
Endo 0.298 -0.341
(0.290) (1.242)
Period -0.052∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗
(0.008) (0.068)
Exo × Period 0.013 0.122
(0.015) (0.086)
Endo × Period 0.006 0.289∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.097)
Observations 5440 4357
Notes: The baseline category “No (constant)”
is a binary variable that indicates the “no insti-
tution” treatment. The dependent variable in re-
gression (1) is a dummy that equals 1 if con-
tribution is positive and 0 otherwise. The de-
pendent variable in regression (2) is the level
of contributions to “PGG No Rule” conditional
on a positive contribution. Stage 1 is a Probit
regression; Stage 2 is a linear regression trun-
cated at 0. Robust standard errors (clustered on
part-II groups) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In Stage 2, the hurdle model estimates a linear regression model truncated at zero.
That is, it measures the effect on the level of contribution, conditional on a positive
contribution. The estimation results show that the “exogenous institution” treatment
leads to significantly higher contribution levels compared to the “no institution” treat-
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ment, while there is no such effect for the “endogenous institution” treatment. Similar
to the decision to contribute, the level of contributions is significantly decreasing over
time in the “no institution” treatment. This negative trend is offset in the “exogenous
institution” treatment. Although, the difference with the “no institution” treatment is
not significant, it is the case that the trend in the “exogenous institution” treatment is
statistically not different from zero (Period + Exo × Period = 0, p = 0.453, Wald
test). The negative trend in the “no institution” treatment is effectively overturned in the
“endogenous institution” treatment and contribution levels rise significantly over time
(Period+ Endo× Period = 0, p = 0.067, Wald test).
Result 5. Decomposing the spillover effect shows that it is mainly due to an effect on
the level of contributions conditional on contributing a positive amount. There is no
significant effect on the decision to make a positive contribution.
Thus, effective institutions in “PGG Rule” do not induce complete free riders to start
contributing in “PGG No Rule”. Rather, the spillover effect works on those who con-
tribute something even without enforcement institutions, by leading them to contribute
more.
4.3 Persistent effects of institutions on behavior, beliefs and preferences
We next analyze if the experience of an enforcement institution in “PGG Rule” has
a persistent effect on cooperative behavior, beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, and
preferences for cooperation. For this purpose, we use data from Parts III and IV, in
which we elicited these variables for each subject. Recall that in these parts subjects
engaged in a one-shot strategy method public goods game without an enforcement in-
stitution and also provided beliefs about others’ cooperativeness. In Part III subjects
interacted in the same group as in Part II, whereas in Part IV they interacted with sub-
jects they had previously not encountered.
We first explore sequential spillover effects, that is, whether the effect of an enforce-
ment institution on contribution behavior persists even after removal of the institution.
Figure 6(a) shows that there are indeed clear differences in average unconditional contri-
butions, across treatments in Parts III and IV.22 In particular, unconditional contribution
levels in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment are significantly higher than in the “no institution” treatment Part III (Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests, p = 0.009 and p = 0.002). In Part IV unconditional contributions
are insignificantly higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum
22The associated mean values, standard errors and econometric test results for contribution behavior as
well as beliefs and cooperation preferences are summarized in Appendix A.3, Tables A.10 to A.12.
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tests, p = 0.173) and significantly higher in the “endogenous institution” treatment
(Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p = 0.017).23
Result 6. The experience of an institution that enforces cooperation exhibits positive
spillover effects not only in the simultaneous environments studied in Part II, but ex-
tends to behavior in subsequent environments without an institution. This holds also for
interactions with strangers with whom there was no prior interaction.
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Figure 6: Treatment effects on own contributions and beliefs about others’ contribu-
tions.
The observed spillover effects could be driven by an effect on beliefs about oth-
ers’ contributions or an effect on conditional cooperation preferences. We first explore
the role of beliefs. Figure 6(b) reveals that the average midpoints of belief intervals
about others’ contributions follow a pattern similar to subjects’ own unconditional con-
tributions. Statistical tests corroborate this visual impression. Beliefs about others’
cooperativeness are significantly higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment and
the “endogenous institution” treatment than in the “no institution” treatment (Part III:
p = 0.012 and p < 0.001; Part IV: p = 0.047 and p = 0.014; Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests). There is no significant difference between the two treatments with an institution
(Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p ≥ 0.196). Thus, in comparison to the “no institution”
treatment, experience with either the endogenously created or the exogenously imposed
institution has a strong positive effect on beliefs about the cooperativeness of others.24
23In comparison to Part I contributions decrease in Parts III and IV in the “no institution” treatment
(Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p ≤ 0.002), whereas this is not the case in the “exogenous institution”
treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p ≥ 0.168).
24In comparison to Part I, in the “no institution” treatment, the average midpoint of the provided belief
intervals is significantly lower in Part III and Part IV (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001 and p =
0.002), while in the “exogenous institution” treatment beliefs do not change (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p ≥ 0.291). In the “endogenous institution” treatment beliefs do also not change from Part I to Part IV
and even increase to Part III (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p = 0.260 and p = 0.018).
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Finally, we investigate the effect of experienced institutions on cooperation prefer-
ences. Figure 7(a)—7(b) show the average conditional contribution levels for each pos-
sible average contribution by the other group members in Part III and IV, respectively.
Figure 7(c) shows an aggregate cooperation preference variable constructed by taking
the amount a subject decided to contribute, averaged across all possible contributions
by others. All three figures clearly indicate that preferences exhibit more cooperation
in the treatments where subjects experienced institutions in Part II than in the treatment
without an institution.
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Figure 7: Treatment effects on cooperation preferences.
We use the aggregate measure to test statistically for differences between treat-
ments. The tests show that in Part III and Part IV, average cooperation preferences
in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment are
significantly stronger than in the “no institution” treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests,
p ≤ 0.024). Thus, the experience of institutions in Part II not only shape beliefs but
also cooperation preferences toward others.25
25In comparison to Part 1, in the “no institution” treatment average cooperation preferences strongly
decrease in Part III and IV (Wilcoxon sign-rank tests, p < 0.001). In both treatments with enforcement
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Result 7. In comparison to the “no institution” treatment, the experience of an institu-
tion that enforces cooperation increases beliefs about others’ cooperativeness as well
as preferences for cooperation, even after the institution ceases to exist. This extends to
beliefs and preferences toward strangers, with whom there was no prior interaction.
The results presented in this section have two important implications. First, institu-
tional spillovers are not limited to concurrent decisions, but can affect behavior in sub-
sequent games and interactions with new groups of people. Second, institutions affect
beliefs about others cooperativeness as well as own cooperation preferences, suggesting
that both are likely mechanisms behind the spillover effects observed in Part II.
5 Spillover effects: The role of endogenous institutions and
increasing strength of institutions
The treatments studied thus far show that institutions induce positive spillover effects
and that these spillovers differ between an exogenously implemented and an endoge-
nously adopted institution. However, this difference could not cleanly be attributed
to the difference in exogeneity versus endogeneity, because in the “endogenous insti-
tution” treatment the minimum contribution requirement, MCR, started at a relatively
low level and increased over time, whereas in the “exogenous institution” treatment the
MCR was fixed at the maximum contribution throughout all periods. Therefore, it is an
open question if the difference in spillovers between treatments is due to endogeneity
or due to the different time path of the strength of the institutions.
To disentangle these two potential explanations, we conducted a follow-up study
comprising two additional treatments. First, the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treat-
ment facilitates the endogenous uptake of 20 as the implemented MCR right from the
beginning and thus yields a cleaner comparison to the “exogenous institution” treat-
ment. Second, the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment implements the average
MCR observed in the “endogenous institution” treatment exogenously for a new set
of subjects and thus yields a clean comparison to the latter treatment. These two ad-
ditional treatments differ from the already reported ones only in the way the MCR is
implemented in Part II. All other parts are unchanged.
We conducted additional sessions in February 2016. Only subjects that had not par-
ticipated in any of the earlier sessions were invited. As before, we ran four sessions per
treatment, two at Maastricht University and two at the University of Zurich. In total, we
institutions in Part II, cooperation preferences stay the same or decrease only weakly from Part I to Part III
and IV, respectively (“exogenous institution” treatment: p = 0.064 and p = 0.127; “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment: p = 0.412 and p = 0.094; Wilcoxon sign-rank tests).
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collected data from 192 additional subjects, equally distributed between the “endoge-
nous 0-20 institution” treatment and the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment.
5.1 The “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment
Part II of the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment differs in two aspects from the
original “endogenous institution” treatment. First, in each period, group members could
only vote for a MCR of either 0 or 20. Second, the unanimity requirement was replaced
by a simple majority rule; that is, a MCR of 20 was implemented whenever three or
more out of four group members voted for it, otherwise the MCR was zero.
These changes were meant to facilitate the implementation of a MCR of 20 and
they were very effective in doing so, as the average implemented MCR is 18.67. Out of
480 periods, an MCR of 20 is implemented in 448 periods, i.e., 93.33% of all periods.
Moreover, 17 out of 24 groups implement a MCR of 20 in all 20 periods and only one
group adopted an MCR of 0 in most periods (see Figure A.3 in Appendix A.2.2 for
the distributions of implemented MCR’s). There is also no discernible time trend in the
evolution of the MCR; already in the first period the average implemented MCR is 16.67
and it remains even higher thereafter (see Figure A.1(b) in Appendix A.2.2).
The average contribution to “PGG Rule” in the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treat-
ment is 19.13, which is significantly greater than in the “no institution” treatment and
not significantly different from the “exogenous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon ranksum
tests, p < 0.001 and p = 0.385, respectively). Overall, the endogenously implemented
MCR in the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment has a strong direct effect and its
effectiveness is comparable to the exogenously implemented MCR of 20 in the “exoge-
nous institution” treatment (see Figure A.1(a) and Figure A.1(b) in Appendix A.2.2).
Hence, in terms of a direct effect, this treatment yields a highly effective endogenously
determined institution.
Figure 8(a) shows the spillover effect in the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treat-
ment, together with the spillover effect in the “exogenous institution” treatment. The
figure suggests a positive but weak spillover effect in the “endogenous 0-20 institution”
treatment. Indeed, across all periods, the average spillover effect amounts to 0.71, but
is not significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.595) and is sig-
nificantly smaller than the effect in the “exogenous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon
ranksum test, p = 0.036).26 There is also no statistically significant time trend (Spear-
man’s ρ = −0.353, p = 0.126).
Result 8. The consistently strong endogenous institution in the “endogenous 0-20 in-
stitution” treatment induces a positive but insignificant spillover effect, which remains
constant over time.
26See Table A.2 in Appendix A.2.2 for an overview of non-parametric tests.
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Given the significant spillover effect in the “exogenous institution” treatment, the
virtual absence of it in the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment appears puzzling. A
possible explanation could be that the instances in which a MCR of 0 was implemented
resulted in very low contribution levels. It indeed holds that the average contributions
to “PGG No Rule” are lower when a MCR of 0 instead of a MCR of 20 is imple-
mented (7.65 vs 10.02). However, considering only those groups and periods in which
a MCR of 20 is implemented does not lead to a significant difference compared to the
“no institution” treatment. Alternatively, it could be that the deviation from unanimity
in implementing the MCR weakens the spillover effect. To explore this possibility we
analyze whether groups in which only three subjects voted for a MCR of 20 behave dif-
ferently from those in which four subjects did so. We do not find a significant difference
between these two cases.
It is also not the case that, conditional on voting for 20, subjects contributed different
amounts depending on whether two or three other group members also voted for 20 (for
an overview of these results, see Table A.7 in Appendix A.2.2). Hence, while we cannot
completely rule out that weakening the unanimity requirement had some negative effect
on contributions in “PGG No Rule”, we cannot detect any such effect in our data. It
remains an open question why the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment exhibits a
weaker spillover effect than “exogenous institution” treatment, despite the institutions
having similarly strong direct effects. However, it is clear that the endogeneity of an
institution alone is not sufficient to produce strong positive spillovers.27
5.2 The “exogenous yoked institution” treatment
In Part II of the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment, we exogenously implemented
an MCR in each period equal to the average of the MCR endogenously adopted in the
“endogenous institution” treatment in the same period, rounded to the nearest integer.
Thus, subjects in the new treatment faced, on average, the same upward trending MCR
as subjects in the “endogenous institution” treatment.
The direct effect in the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment is comparable to
the one in the “endogenous institution” treatment. Contributions to “PGG Rule” in
the new treatment increase in a similar way as they do in the “endogenous institution”
treatment (see Figure A.1(c) and Figure A.1(d) in Appendix A.2.2). Averaged over all
27In Part I there are no significant differences between the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment and
the “no institution” treatment, regarding unconditional contributions, beliefs about others’ contributions
and average cooperation preferences (Wilcoxon ranksum tests, p ≥ 0.725). Since there is no strong
spillover effect in the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment it is not surprising that we also do not find
strong differences in unconditional contributions, beliefs and average cooperation preferences between the
“endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment and the “no institution” treatment in Part III and IV, respectively
(Wilcoxon ranksum tests, p ≥ 0.198). For all non-parametric tests, see Table A.10–A.12 in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 8: Spillover effects to “PGG No Rule”.
periods, there are no significant differences between the two treatments with respect to
contributions to “PGG Rule” (16.95 in the “endogenous institution” treatment vs 17.38
in the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment; Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.511).
The same holds for the spillover effect, which is shown in Figure 8(b), together with the
spillover effect in the “endogenous institution” treatment. Over all periods, the aver-
age spillover effect is somewhat weaker in the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment
(1.98) than in the “endogenous institution” treatment (3.12), but the difference is sta-
tistically insignificant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.444). As in the “endogenous
institution” treatment, the spillover effect in the “exogenous yoked institution” treat-
ment exhibits a significantly increasing trend (Spearman’s ρ = 0.854, p < 0.001).
These results are corroborated by regression analyses (see Table A.3 in Appendix A.2).
Result 9. Institutions that are initially weak, but strengthen over time lead to an in-
creasing spillover effect. The effect is independent of whether the institutions are en-
dogenously adopted or exogenously imposed.
Finally, consistent with our findings for the “endogenous institution” treatment, the
increasing spillover effect in the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment appears to be
due to an increase of contributions among those subjects who already contributed some
positive amount and not to a change in the decision whether to contribute at all (see
Table A.5 in Appendix A.2.2).28
28Concerning Parts I, III and IV, the results in the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment are consistent
with those in the “endogenous institution” treatment, but the effects are slightly weaker. In Part I, com-
pared to the “no institution” treatment, there are no significant differences with respect to unconditional
contributions, beliefs about others’ contributions and cooperation preferences (Wilcoxon ranksum tests,
p ≥ 0.693). In Part III, the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment leads to significantly higher uncon-
ditional contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions compared to the “no institution” treatment
(Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.012 and p = 0.029). There is also an increase in cooperation preferences
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6 Discussion
Our results clearly demonstrate the existence of spillover effects from an environment
governed by an institution (“PGG Rule”) to behavior in a similar environment not gov-
erned by an institution (“PGG No Rule”). We find evidence of such spillovers both
when institutions are exogenously imposed (in the “exogenous institution” treatment
and the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment) and when they are endogenously de-
termined (in the “endogenous institution” treatment, but not in the “endogenous 0-20
institution” treatment). Moreover, our results show that the experience of an institu-
tion affects behavior as well as both beliefs and cooperation preferences in subsequent
interactions with the same group members and with strangers.
While it was not our first goal to identify a single mechanism as the main driver of
spillovers, it is nevertheless informative to compare our results to the potential theoret-
ical mechanisms outlined in Table 1 of Section 2. The fact that the observed spillover
effects are positive rules out mechanisms that predict negative effects, such as mech-
anisms that work through a negative effect on preferences, e.g., control aversion and
pure altruism, or beliefs, e.g., a pessimistic signal about others’ behavior (see the right
column of Table 1).
The results of Part III and IV strongly suggest that the observed spillover effects
are due both to a positive influence of institutions on beliefs regarding others’ cooper-
ativeness and on cooperative preferences. One potential preference mechanism is that
the investigated institutions, like laws, have an expressive function and allow subjects
to signal their rule-abiding type by complying with them even when they cannot be
enforced (see the upper left column of Table 1). In Part V we elicited rule-following
propensity (RFT), which provides a means of testing whether subjects who are more
willing to follow an arbitrary and unenforced rule in the RFT are also more willing
to follow the rule highlighted by the institution in “PGG Rule” (cf. Kimbrough and
Vostroknutov (2016)). However, we find no significant effects of the interactions be-
tween subjects’ rule-following propensity and any of the treatments with an institution
(see column (1) of Table A.9 in Appendix A.2.5). This suggests that rule following is
not an important reason for the observed spillover effects.
Another related potential preference channel is provided by the Social Heuristics
Hypotheses (SHH), which proposes that cooperative norms establish simple heuristics
that are followed intuitively. We can explore whether this channel is active using the
results from the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which we elicited in Part V. CRT
but it fails to reach statistic significance (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p = 0.302). In Part IV, with respect to
strangers, unconditional contributions, beliefs about others’ contributions and cooperation preferences are
higher than in “no institution” treatment, but the differences are not quite statistically significant (Wilcoxon
ranksum tests, p ≥ 0.108). For details, see Tables A.10—A.12.
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scores are inversely related to a tendency to rely on intuition in answering questions
with an immediate intuitive, but incorrect, answer. According to the SHH, if the in-
stitution in “PGG Rule” provides a heuristic for cooperation, then subjects who score
lower on cognitive reflection should follow the norm intuitively and contribute more in
other choices (cf. the argument in Peysakhovich and Rand (2016)). We find a negative
significant effect of the interaction between the CRT score and the treatments with in-
stitutions only for the “exogenous institution” treatment (see column (2) of Table A.9 in
Appendix A.2.5). Thus, there is only weak—at best suggestive— evidence consistent
with the idea that heuristic thinkers exhibit greater positive spillover effects.
We also find that subjects in the two treatments with an endogenously implemented
institution in “PGG Rule” do not generally contribute more to “PGG No Rule” than
subjects in the two treatments with an exogenously implemented institution in “PGG
Rule”. Thus, we cannot confirm that a spillover effect is triggered because endoge-
nously implemented institutions signal a social norm that subjects like to follow (see
the upper left column of Table 1). The failure to detect this mechanism could be driven
by the fact that subjects do not recognize the voting phase as an expression of the so-
cial norm in the group, or because they don’t possess preferences to follow such social
norms.
We do find that institutions that strengthen over time are more successful in in-
fluencing behavior in unregulated environments than those that are strong and stable
from the beginning. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Jackson and
Acemoglu (2017) who argue that strengthening laws over time can influence social
norms, independent of the mechanism with which they are implemented. These norms,
in turn, might be followed also in the unregulated environment. Although the mecha-
nism that drives the theoretical predictions—cooperation with law enforcement through
whistleblowing—is not present in our experiment, it is conceivable that for other rea-
sons social norms react more strongly to incremental increases in institutions than to
large discrete changes.
Our results in Parts III and IV indicate that beliefs are a likely channel for spillover
effects. However, beliefs in in these parts do not only reflect a pure institution effect
because they are also influenced by the history of experienced contributions in Part II,
which in turn are influenced by the existence of an institution. The (non-incentivized)
beliefs in period 1 of Part II can provide information on the role of beliefs without
this additional effect. Beliefs in period 1 were elicited before any contribution decision
was made or observed, but after the institution was implemented. Hence, these beliefs
could be influenced by the institution if it serves as a clue for the behavior of others’
(see the lower left column of Table 1). An analysis of these beliefs shows that in the
“exogenous institution” treatment and in the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment,
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in period 1, beliefs about others’ cooperativeness are at least marginally significantly
higher than in the “no institution” treatment (12.43 and 12.56 vs 11.34; Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests, p = 0.054 and p = 0.044). There are no significant differences in beliefs
for the “no institution” treatment. That there are also no significant differences for the
“endogenous institution” treatment and the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment, is
likely due to the relatively low MCR in period 1 in these treatments. However, in the
“endogenous institution” treatment there is a positively significant correlation between
the implemented MCR and beliefs (Spearman’s ρ = 0.279, p = 0.007).29 Hence, the
evidence from beliefs in period 1 further supports the idea that institutions in “PGG
Rule” affect beliefs in “PGG No Rule”, which in turn increases contributions in “PGG
No Rule”, thus creating at least part of the spillover effects.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we test whether an institution that has a powerful direct effect on behav-
ior in one domain also influences how cooperatively a group acts in another domain
where the institution exerts no direct influence. We find clear evidence in favor of such
spillover effects, though their magnitude appears to vary depending on the nature of the
institution. Some of our treatments suggest that there may be differences in spillover
effects between exogenously imposed and endogenously adopted institutions, with the
former having stronger spillover effects that increase over time. However, additional
treatments indicate that the increasing spillover effect in the endogenous institution is
due to the increasing strength of the institution and that the endogenous establishment
of the institution itself does not have a significant additional effect on spillovers.
We also find that both types of institutions have effects that persist beyond their pres-
ence. Treated subjects exhibit more pro-social behavior than untreated ones even after
the institution is removed. Moreover, the experience with an enforcement institution
leads to more positive beliefs about others’ contributions and to stronger conditional
cooperation preferences. These effects also extend to new counterparts, with whom no
previous interaction occurred. This, together with evidence that beliefs are positively
29In the “exogenous yoked institution” treatment, there is no variation in the MCR and thus no such
relationship possible. The above tests use individual observations because, in period 1, subjects did not yet
receive feedback about contributions by their group members and thus individual observations of beliefs
about these contributions can be treated as independent. However, in the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment and the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment subjects received feedback about the group voting
outcome before stating their beliefs in period 1. Applying the conservative approach of using groups as
independent observations in period 1, the difference between the “no institution” treatment and the “en-
dogenous 0-20 institution” treatment and correlations between the MCR and beliefs in the “endogenous
institution” treatment are significant with parametric regressions clustered on the group level (p = 0.098
and p = 0.050, respectively) but fail to reach significance with non-parametric tests using group averages
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.135; Spearman’s ρ = 0.325, p = 0.130).
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affected by the mere presence of an institution, strongly suggests that spillover effects
are due to combined changes in preferences for cooperation and changes in beliefs about
others’ contributions.
Understanding spillover effects is important for evaluating the overall effectiveness
of institutions. As our results show, the extent to which an institution improves welfare
and efficiency is only partly determined by changes in the behaviors it directly governs.
Large indirect effects may also obtain through how an institution influences behavior
in other domains. In our case, such effects are positive, making the institution more
effective than one would surmise merely by looking at how it affects the regulated
behavior. Moreover, we also show that such effects may be persistent and last into
future novel interactions. Our results thus suggest that policymakers should account for
such spillover effects in evaluating the impacts of policies.
From a broader perspective, our study can also speak to the literature on the inter-
relation between institutions and culture (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006, 2008;
Tabellini, 2008, 2010; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Ga¨chter and Schulz, 2016). The set
of beliefs and preferences that the members of a society hold are commonly acknowl-
edged as important determinants of a society’s culture. In this regard, we provide causal
evidence that institutions can shape culture persistently, and that the institutionally in-
duced change in culture can lead to sizable welfare effects.
Needless to say that more work is necessary to understand when and how the behav-
ioral effects of institutions extend to unregulated behaviors and settings. One interesting
open question concerns the dynamics of cooperative behavior in the long run. In reality,
it is often infeasible to increase the strength of institutions indefinitely. Therefore, it
could be that the positive spillover effects on voluntary cooperation start to decrease
once such an upper bound is reached. Similarly, in the long run, cooperative behavior
without institutions has been shown to break down completely. It would be interesting
to study whether this also holds for spillover effects induced by our strong and stable
institutions, or whether cooperation eventually stabilizes at some positive level.
Our study is only an initial step in investigating how institutions that incentivize pro-
social behaviors in some domains spill over to influence pro-social behaviors in other
domains. Many other institutions and settings are conceivable, and we only explore
a small part of this set. For example, while our exogenously implemented institution
enforced the socially most efficient cooperation level at no cost, many institutions in
the field are not fully efficient or come at some other costs. This imperfection of the
direct effects may limit or even negate the positive spillovers from an institution. Future
research should, therefore, examine spillover effects more broadly, across a wide variety
of contexts and institutional features. Our study provides an experimental set-up that
can be used as an easily extendable workhorse for this purpose.
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A [For Online Publication] Appendix
A.1 Theoretical predictions - Standard preferences
If we assume that players are only motivated to maximize their own material payoff,
the game-theoretic predictions for the one-stage game are as follows. Since the material
payoff from the “PGG No Rule” is independent of the “PGG Rule”, and vice versa, a
player’s overall utility Ui is additive separable into payoffs from “PGG No Rule”, piLi ,
and payoffs from “PGG Rule”, piRi .
Given the contributions of all other players, the payoff piLi of player i from “PGG
No Rule” is equal to
piLi (g
L
1 , ..., g
L
4 ) = w
L − gLi + a
4∑
j=1
gLj , (3)
where 0 < a < 1 < 4a. The parameter amodels the marginal per capita return (MPCR)
from contributing to the public good, wL is the per period endowment, and gLi is player
i’s contribution to the public good in “PGG No Rule”. Assumption a < 1 implies
that contributing nothing is the strictly dominant action for every player with standard
preferences because every player’s material payoff is maximized by contributing zero
to the public good regardless of the other players’ contributions.
The payoff piRi of player i from “PGG Rule” is equal to
piRi (g
R
1 , ..., g
R
4 ) =

wR − gRi + a
4∑
j=1
gRj if g
R
i ≥ MCR
0 if gRi < MCR,
(4)
where MCR is the minimum contribution requirement that is implemented by the insti-
tution. The MCR is equal to zero in the “no institution” treatment, equal to wR in the
“exogenous institution” treatment, and equal to the outcome of the voting process in the
“endogenous institution” treatment.
Because the institution deters any material incentive to contribute less than the con-
tribution threshold, the dominant action for every player with standard preferences is to
contribute exactly the MCR level in “PGG Rule”. In the “no institution” treatment, the
strategy profile {(gL1 , gR1 ), (gL2 , gR2 ), (gL3 , gR3 ), (gL4 , gR4 )} = {(0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0)}
is thus the unique Nash equilibrium of the entire game. In the “exogenous institution”
treatment, the strategy profile {(0, wR), (0, wR), (0, wR), (0, wR)} is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
In the “endogenous institution” treatment, every period consists of two stages - a
voting stage and a contribution stage. Therefore both voting behavior in the first stage
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and the contributions in the second stage are part of a player’s strategy. In a subgame
perfect equilibrium, players play a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. We solve the
game by applying backward induction. Consider first the contribution stage. If players
attempt to maximize their material payoff, they contribute nothing in the “PGG No
Rule” and according to the MCR in “PGG Rule”. Given this behavior in the contribution
stage one can derive the optimal voting behavior in the voting stage.
Since the contributions in “PGG No Rule” are unaffected by wR, voting can affect
payoffs only in “PGG Rule”. It is easily seen that everybody placing the same vote is
a Nash equilibrium in the voting subgame. Since 4a > 1, deviating to a lower vote (if
possible) decreases the MCR and makes the deviating player strictly worse off because
all players will decrease their contributions to this lower level in stage 2. Deviating to
a higher vote (if possible) does not change the MCR and thus behavior in the second
stage, leaving the payoff of the deviating player unaltered. In case everybody votes for
20 deviating to a lower vote makes the deviating player strictly worse off and a deviation
to a higher vote is not possible. Thus, only if all other players vote for 20, also voting
for 20 is a strict best response which yields the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: If players have standard preferences, there exists a unique strict
subgame perfect equilibrium in which all players vote to set the MCR equal to the full
endowment (vi = wR ∀ i), contribute their full endowment in “PGG Rule” (gRi =
wR ∀ i), and contribute nothing in “PGG No Rule” (gi = 0 ∀ i).30
30Note that there exist other subgame perfect equilibria in which at least two players vote for the same
MCR vi = vj < wR, vi = min {(vi)i∈I}, all contribute vi = MCR in “PGG Rule” and 0 in “PGG
No Rule”. This is the case because deviating in their vote from vi would not change the implemented
threshold (only the smallest vote counts).
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A.2 Part II - Results
A.2.1 Regression analysis of direct and spillover effects in the “exogenous insti-
tution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment
The results regarding spillover effects are corroborated using regression analyses. Ta-
ble A.1 reports the outcome of an OLS and a random effects Tobit panel regression, re-
spectively. The independent variable is contributions to “PGG No Rule”. The variable
“No (constant)” indicates the “no institution” treatment as the baseline category, “Exo”
(“Endo”) is a dummy variable for the “exogenous institution” treatment (“endogenous
institution” treatment), “Period” captures the contribution dynamics in the “no institu-
tion” treatment and the interaction variables “Exo × Period” (“Endo × Period”) reflect
how these dynamics differ in the two treatments with institutions in comparison to the
treatment with no institution.
Table A.1: Treatment effect on contributions
to “PGG No Rule”
(1) (2)
OLS Tobit panel
No (constant) 12.208∗∗∗ 13.911∗∗∗
(1.012) (1.219)
Exo 2.540∗ 3.886∗
(1.405) (2.110)
Endo 0.477 0.690
(1.380) (1.633)
Period -0.291∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.074)
Exo × Period 0.080 0.105
(0.088) (0.105)
Endo × Period 0.252∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.113)
Observations 5440 5440
Adjusted R2 0.062
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on part-II
groups in model (1) and bootstrapped standard er-
rors (55 replications) in model (2) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The results show that the “exogenous institution” treatment (“Exo”) leads to an up-
ward shift in the level of contributions, whereas no such effect is detected for the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment (“Endo”). Thus, there is a spillover effect ‘on impact’
in the “exogenous institution” treatment but not in the “endogenous institution” treat-
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ment. Over time the effects are opposite. In the “exogenous institution” treatment the
decline in contributions over the 20 periods is the same as in the “no institution” treat-
ment (“Exo × Period” is statistically insignificant), which implies a stable spillover
effect. In contrast, in the “endogenous institution” treatment, the downward dynamics
observed in the “no institution” treatment are completely offset (coefficient of “Endo ×
Period” is almost equal to the negative of “Period” and statistically significant), which
implies an increasing spillover effect over time.
Table A.3 in Appendix A.2.2 shows that the results reported here are robust to the
inclusion of individual characteristics as control variables. Of all individual characteris-
tics elicited in Part V, the altruism, CRT and rule-following measure have a positive and
significant effect on contributions to “PGG No Rule”. Average trust has a marginally
significant, negative effect on contributions to “PGG No Rule”.
A.2.2 Contributions to “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”
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Figure A.1: Mean contributions under “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”, and MCR.
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Figure A.2: Average contributions to “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”.
Notes: Each dot shows one group’s average contribution across the 20 periods of Part II to “PGG No Rule”
(vertical axis) and “PGG Rule” (horizontal axis).
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Table A.2: Direct and spillover effect of institutions on contributions in the “en-
dogenous 0-20 institution” treatment and the “exogenous yoked institution” treat-
ment
Period
All 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20
Direct effect 10.31 8.52 9.55 11.27 11.88
(s.e.) (0.56) (0.52) (0.55) (0.68) (0.56)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Endo 0-20 Spillover effect 0.71 1.18 0.38 0.97 0.31
(N=24) (s.e.) (1.00) (0.79) (0.99) (1.16) (1.31)
[p-value] [0.595] [0.328] [0.865] [0.395] [0.873]
Relative size of 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.03
spillover effect
Direct effect 8.56 3.83 8.03 10.86 11.50
(s.e.) (0.22) (0.40) (0.27) (0.17) (0.15)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Exo yoked Spillover effect 1.98 0.39 1.13 3.22 3.18
(N=24) (s.e.) (0.95) (0.87) (1.17) (1.14) (1.19)
[p-value] [0.142] [0.670] [0.551] [0.072] [0.053]
Relative size of 0.23 0.10 0.14 0.30 0.28
spillover effect
Notes: For each group in the treatments, the direct (spillover) effect equals the difference be-
tween that group’s average contributions to “PGG Rule” (“PGG No Rule”) and the average
contributions of all groups to “PGG Rule” (“PGG No Rule”) in the “no institution” treatment.
p-values are from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the group-level contributions in “PGG
Rule” (“PGG No Rule”) of the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous insti-
tution” treatment, respectively, to contributions in “PGG Rule” (“PGG No Rule”) in the “no
institution” treatment. Relative size of spillover effect is the quotient of spillover and direct
effect.
47
Table A.3: Treatment effect on contributions to “PGG No Rule”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Tobit panel Tobit panel Tobit panel
No (constant) 12.208∗∗∗ 5.730∗ 1.318 13.783∗∗∗ 2.670 -7.596
(1.009) (3.318) (3.082) (1.297) (5.763) (5.417)
Exo 2.540∗ 2.810∗∗ 2.572∗∗ 3.771∗∗ 4.283∗ 3.784∗∗∗
(1.401) (1.362) (1.190) (1.782) (2.229) (1.343)
Endo 0-20 1.106 1.623 1.544 2.201 3.204∗∗ 3.025∗
(1.242) (1.178) (1.019) (1.505) (1.575) (1.656)
Endo 0.477 0.909 0.864 0.669 1.480 1.413
(1.376) (1.315) (1.192) (2.146) (1.330) (1.341)
Exo yoked -0.213 0.237 0.235 -1.394 -0.576 -0.554
(1.497) (1.491) (1.302) (1.668) (1.640) (1.738)
Period -0.291∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.061) (0.068) (0.079)
Exo 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.103 0.103 0.103
× Period (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.112) (0.113) (0.120)
Endo 0-20 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.095 -0.096 -0.095
× Period (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.097) (0.108) (0.120)
Endo 0.252∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
× Period (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.118) (0.104) (0.101)
Exo yoked 0.209∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
× Period (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.102) (0.121)
Controls (Part I) No NO YES NO NO YES
Controls (Part V) No YES YES NO YES YES
Observations 9280 9280 9280 9280 9280 9280
Adj. R2 0.057 0.106 0.183
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on part-II groups in models (1)-(3) and bootstrapped standard errors
(55 replications) in models (4)-(6) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: The effect of
the MCR on contributions to
“PGG No Rule”
(1)
OLS
MCR 0.198∗∗∗
(0.064)
Period -0.211∗∗∗
(0.039)
Constant 11.189∗∗∗
(0.909)
Observations 5440
Adjusted R2 0.073
Notes: Robust standard errors
clustered on part-II groups in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Contributions to “PGG No Rule”
(1) Hurdle (2) Hurdle
Stage 1 Stage 2
No (constant) 1.294∗∗∗ 13.224∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.909)
Exo -0.087 3.135∗∗∗
(0.284) (1.061)
Endo 0-20 0.169 0.585
(0.237) (1.178)
Endo 0.298 -0.339
(0.289) (1.234)
Exo yoked 0.022 -0.396
(0.305) (1.237)
Period -0.052∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗
(0.008) (0.068)
Exo × Period 0.013 0.121
(0.015) (0.085)
Endo 0-20 × Period -0.014 0.044
(0.011) (0.100)
Endo × Period 0.006 0.288∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.097)
Exo yoked × Period 0.020 0.195∗∗
(0.016) (0.098)
Observations 9280 7419
Notes: The baseline category “No (constant)” is a bi-
nary variable that indicates the “no institution” treatment.
The dependent variable in regression (1) is a dummy that
equals 1 if contribution is positive and 0 otherwise. The
dependent variable in regression (2) is the level of contri-
butions to “PGG No Rule” conditional on a positive con-
tribution. Stage 1 is a Probit regression; Stage 2 is a linear
regression truncated at 0. Robust standard errors (clustered
on part-II groups) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.2.3 Voting behavior
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Figure A.3: Frequency of implemented MCR’s (group averages) in the “endogenous
0-20 institution” treatment.
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Table A.6: Correlations of individual char-
acteristics with voting decisions in period 1
Vote N
Part I - Uncond. contr. 0.237∗∗ 92
(0.023)
Part I - Belief 0.270∗∗∗ 92
(0.009)
Part I - Avg. cond. contr. 0.148 92
(0.159)
Risk 0.047 92
(0.654)
Patience 0.058 92
(0.581)
Altruism 0.137 92
(0.190)
Avg. pos. reciprocity -0.006 92
(0.949)
Avg. neg. reciprocity -0.127 92
(0.226)
Avg. trust -0.012 92
(0.913)
CRT -0.027 66
(0.832)
RFT -0.116 92
(0.270)
Age -0.021 92
(0.846)
Female -0.197* 92
(0.060)
Business & economics 0.034 92
(0.750)
Notes: The table reports Spearman’s rank corre-
lation coefficients. P-values in parentheses. CRT
has 66 observations only because we exclude the
26 subjects who indicated that they saw the CRT
questions before. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Contributions to “PGG No Rule” for different voting outcomes in
the “endogenous 0-20 institution” treatment
Votes for a MCR of 20
0 1 2 3 4
Number of periods 3 6 23 91 357
Avg. contribution to “PGG No Rule” 4.00 5.88 8.59 9.52 10.14
...of those who voted for 20 - 3.5 10.11 10.47 10.14
...of those who voted for 0 4.00 6.67 7.07 6.68 -
A.2.4 Evidence against imitation
In this part, we test whether our findings are driven by subjects who simply copied their
decisions in “PGG Rule” to “PGG No Rule”. If that would be the case, then it could
explain the treatment effects that we find, because, due to the MCR, contributions to
“PGG Rule” are higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous
institution” treatment than in the “no institution” treatment.
First, we focus on cases in which subjects inserted identical contribution levels in
“PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”. In the “no institution” treatment, we find that this
is the case in 62.77 percent of observations. In the “exogenous institution” treatment
and the “endogenous institution” treatment, the frequency of such cases is significantly
lower (34.20 percent and 37.88 percent, respectively; Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001 and
p < 0.001, respectively). However, contributing the same amount to “PGG No Rule”
and “PGG Rule” is not necessarily evidence of imitation. Indeed, for many preference
types, a person with identical beliefs about others’ behavior across the two games has
no reason to contribute anything but identical values.Nevertheless, imitation by copying
contributions may occur in those relatively infrequent cases where contributions are
identical.
To determine whether the treatments have an effect only because subjects copy the
MCR in “PGG No Rule”, we consider those cases in the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment in which a MCR above 0 but below 20 was implemented. Only for those cases it is
fairly certain that, if subjects imitated the MCR in “PGG No Rule”, it is deliberate and
not because they hit the corner of 0 or 20. Out of 868 cases (individual observations)
in which a MCR above 0 and below 20 was implemented, the contributions to “PGG
No Rule” were identical to the contributions to “PGG Rule” in 199 cases (22.93 per-
cent) and were identical to the MCR in 86 cases (9.91 percent). Thus, in maximally 10
percent of all cases may have subjects mirrored the MCR deliberately. Excluding those
observations and only considering a MCR between 0 and 20, we still find a highly sig-
nificant positive correlation between the implemented MCR and contributions to “PGG
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No Rule” (Spearman’s rho, ρ = 0.181, p < 0.001).31 Thus, we don’t find evidence that
such a pure imitation effect is driving the treatment effect.
Second, we test whether two proxy variables, which arguably measure proneness
to simply (but perhaps imperfectly) imitating the MCR in “PGG No Rule”, explain
contributions to “PGG No Rule”. These two variables are i) a binary variable that indi-
cates whether the contribution to “PGG Rule” was submitted first, and ii) a continuous
variables that measures the time span in between the contribution submission to “PGG
Rule” and “PGG No Rule”. We assume that subjects who submit their contribution
decision for “PGG Rule” first and let little time pass in between the two decisions are
more prone to simply (but possibly imperfectly) imitate the MCR.
Averaged over all periods, the proportion of subjects who submitted their contribu-
tion decision for “PGG Rule” before their decision for “PGG No Rule” is somewhat
higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment (34.55 percent) and the “endogenous
institution” treatment (37.17 percent) than in the “no institution” treatment (30.49 per-
cent). Furthermore, in the very first period, the differences are even more pronounced
(26.14 percent in the “exogenous institution” treatment and 31.52 percent in the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment vs 15.22 percent in the “no institution” treatment). On
the other hand, the time between the submissions is lower in the “no institution” treat-
ment than in both the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment (1.54 seconds vs 2.17 and 2.43 seconds, respectively).
When we regress the decision to submit first in “PGG Rule” on the absolute dif-
ference in contributions between “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule” (see column (1)
of Table A.8), we find that there is no effect in the “no institution” treatment and the
“exogenous institution” treatment, but a significantly positive effect in the “endogenous
institution” treatment. Thus, submitting the contribution to “PGG Rule” first signif-
icantly increases the difference in contributions between the “PGG Rule” and “PGG
No Rule” in the “endogenous institution” treatment compared to the “no institution”
treatment, which is the opposite of what one would expect in case of an imitation effect.
When regressing the time span between the submissions of contributions on the
absolute difference in contributions in the two games (see column (2) of Table A.8), we
do not find any significant effect.
Finally, when regressing all interactions on the absolute difference in contribution
between “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule” (see column (3) of Table A.8), we find that,
in the “no institution” treatment, the difference in contributions significantly decreases
the shorter is the difference in time between the two decisions, but only if one decides
about “PGG Rule” first. Thus, this looks like an imitation effect. However, the effect is
31When taking individual averages over all relevant periods that fit the criteria, the results remain the
same (Spearman’s rho, ρ = 0.299, p = 0.005).
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completely counteracted in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous
institution” treatment. Thus, to summarize, we don’t find any evidence that imitation
effects could explain our results.
Table A.8: Influence of decision sequence and time on the difference
in contributions
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
Period 0.135∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
No (constant) 0.563 0.426 0.468
(0.507) (0.507) (0.503)
Exo 5.328∗∗∗ 5.470∗∗∗ 5.306∗∗∗
(1.090) (1.023) (1.099)
Endo 3.000∗∗∗ 3.447∗∗∗ 2.898∗∗∗
(0.919) (1.070) (0.993)
Right first -0.039 -0.781∗
(0.295) (0.408)
Right first × Exo 0.437 1.279
(0.830) (0.896)
Right first × Endo 1.362∗ 2.182∗∗
(0.764) (0.964)
Time diff 0.043 0.034
(0.043) (0.036)
Time diff × Exo -0.009 0.010
(0.060) (0.064)
Time diff × Endo 0.008 0.030
(0.085) (0.084)
Right first × Time diff 0.641∗∗∗
(0.226)
Right first × Time diff × Exo -0.694∗∗∗
(0.244)
Right first × Time diff × Endo -0.672∗∗∗
(0.250)
Observations 5440 5440 5440
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.125 0.128
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute difference in contributions be-
tween “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”. “Right first” is a binary variable that
is 1 if the subject submitted his decision for “PGG Rule” first and zero other-
wise. “Time diff” is the time difference, in seconds, between the first and the
second submission of contribution decision. Robust standard errors (clustered
on part-II groups) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.2.5 Potential channels
Table A.9: Rule-following channel and SSH
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
No (constant) 11.701∗∗∗ 9.293∗∗∗
(1.242) (1.298)
Exo 2.062 5.321∗∗∗
(1.872) (1.789)
Endo 0-20 0.482 1.677
(1.558) (1.625)
Endo 1.123 2.652
(1.653) (1.748)
Exo yoked -0.995 1.514
(1.841) (1.732)
Period -0.291∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.061)
Exo × Period 0.080 0.062
(0.088) (0.096)
Endo 0-20 × Period -0.038 -0.072
(0.073) (0.082)
Endo × Period 0.252∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗
(0.091) (0.106)
Exo yoked × Period 0.209∗∗ 0.194∗
(0.092) (0.100)
RFT 0.037
(0.038)
Exo × RFT 0.036
(0.066)
Endo 0-20 × RFT 0.046
(0.056)
Endo × RFT -0.047
(0.059)
Exo yoked × RFT 0.062
(0.061)
CRT 1.636∗∗∗
(0.467)
Exo × CRT -1.462∗∗
(0.666)
Endo 0-20 × CRT -0.390
(0.728)
Endo × CRT -1.152
(0.925)
Exo yoked × CRT -0.842
(0.570)
Observations 9280 7260
Adj. R2 0.069 0.087
Notes: The independent variable is contributions to
“PGG No Rule”. There are fewer observation in
model (2) as we excluded those subjects that indi-
cated that they had seen the CRT questions before.
Robust standard errors (clustered on part-II groups)
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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A.3 Part I, III, IV - Results
Table A.10: Unconditional contributions
Part I Part III Part IV
p-value
(I vs. III)
p-value
(I vs. IV)
p-value
(III vs. IV)
No inst. 11.37 6.95 8.65 0.000 0.002 0.005
(N=23) (.60) (1.01) (.88)
Exo. inst. 11.40 10.40 10.30 0.398 0.168 0.961
(N=22) (.67) (.85) (.75)
Endo. 0-20 inst. 11.53 8.42 9.06 0.001 0.002 0.126
(N=24) (.68) (.95) (.81)
Endo. inst. 11.53 12.03 11.37 0.553 0.738 0.212
(N=23) (.61) (1.05) (.87)
Exo. yoked inst. 11.75 10.35 10.09 0.086 0.036 0.406
(N=24) (.47) (.97) (.84)
p-value 0.901 0.009 0.173
(No vs. Exo)
p-value 0.966 0.268 0.765
(No vs. Endo 0-20)
p-value 0.783 0.002 0.017
(No vs. Endo)
p-value 0.693 0.012 0.145
(No vs. Exo yoked)
p-value 0.921 0.082 0.198
(Exo vs. Endo 0-20)
p-value 0.924 0.183 0.205
(Endo vs. Exo yoked)
p-value 0.750 0.195 0.159
(Exo vs. Endo)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Across treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests. Within treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
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Table A.11: Midpoint of belief interval
Part I Part III Part IV
p-value
(I vs. III)
p-value
(I vs. IV)
p-value
(III vs. IV)
No inst. 11.88 8.14 9.78 0.000 0.002 0.002
(N=23) (.38) (.94) (.70)
Exo. inst. 11.98 11.41 11.74 0.987 0.871 0.291
(N=22) (.44) (.78) (.59)
Endo. 0-20 inst. 12.07 9.82 11.09 0.010 0.045 0.004
(N=24) (.37) (.79) (.58)
Endo. inst. 11.42 13.02 11.96 0.018 0.260 0.005
(N=23) (.37) (.66) (.52)
Exo. yoked inst. 11.80 10.99 11.04 0.265 0.067 0.668
(N=24) (.35) (.77) (.50)
p-value 0.892 0.012 0.047
(No vs. Exo)
p-value 0.725 0.233 0.198
(No vs. Endo 0-20)
p-value 0.422 0.000 0.013
(No vs. Endo)
p-value 0.966 0.029 0.108
(No vs. Exo yoked)
p-value 0.973 0.124 0.468
(Exo vs. Endo 0-20)
p-value 0.469 0.047 0.106
(Endo vs. Exo yoked)
p-value 0.346 0.196 0.708
(Exo vs. Endo)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Across treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests. Within treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
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Table A.12: Avg. conditional contributions
Part I Part III Part IV
p-value
(I vs. III)
p-value
(I vs. IV)
p-value
(III vs. IV)
No inst. 7.86 5.63 5.76 0.000 0.000 0.867
(N=23) (.50) (.54) (.48)
Exo. inst. 8.48 7.60 7.64 0.064 0.127 0.948
(N=22) (.45) (.51) (.65)
Endo. 0-20 inst. 7.89 6.30 6.24 0.002 0.002 0.558
(N=24) (.30) (.54) (.51)
Endo. inst. 7.95 7.69 7.20 0.412 0.094 0.023
(N=23) (.35) (.35) (.45)
Exo. yoked inst. 7.75 6.41 6.14 0.012 0.002 0.415
(N=24) (.47) (.57) (.53)
p-value 0.414 0.005 0.011
(No vs. Exo)
p-value 0.949 0.431 0.734
(No vs. Endo 0-20)
p-value 0.861 0.008 0.024
(No vs. Endo)
p-value 0.915 0.302 0.431
(No vs. Exo yoked)
p-value 0.276 0.077 0.065
(Exo vs. Endo 0-20)
p-value 0.924 0.101 0.069
(Endo vs. Exo yoked)
p-value 0.401 0.991 0.829
(Exo vs. Endo)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Across treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests. Within treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
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A.4 Part V - Questions
• Risk question (SOEP, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009)
How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Please tick a box on the scale where the value 0 means: “not at all willing to take
risks” and the value 10 means: “very willing to take risks”.
• Patience question (SOEP, 2008)
How would you describe yourself: Are you generally an impatient person, or
someone who always shows great patience?
Please tick a box on the scale where the value 0 means: “very impatient” and the
value 10 means: “very patient”.
• Altruism question (SOEP, 2004, 2008)
Is it important for you to be there for others?
Please tick a box on the scale where the value 0 means:“not at all important” and
the value 4 means: “very important”.
• Reciprocity question (SOEP, 2005)
For the questions below, please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means:
“does not apply to me at all” and the value 7 means: “applies to me perfectly”.
(1) If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it.
(2) If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter
what the cost.
(3) If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her.
(4) I go out of the way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.
(5) If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back.
(6) I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.
• Trust question (SOEP, 2003, 2008)
For the questions below, please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means:
“totally disagree” and the value 4 means: “totally agree”.
On the whole one can trust people.
Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone.
If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them.
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General instructions 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment. 
Please read this first page of the instructions carefully on your own. We will then read 
the rest of the instructions aloud in front of all participants.  
 
In the experiment you can earn a considerable amount of money in addition to the 10 Swiss 
francs that you receive for showing up on time. How much you earn will depend on your 
own decisions and those of the other participants. It is thus very important that you read the 
instructions carefully. If you have any questions please do not ask aloud but raise your hand.  
 
During the experiment, speaking with the other participants and the use of mobile 
phones are not allowed. Violation of these rules can lead to exclusion from the experiment 
and loss of all associated earnings. 
 
During the experiment, we will refer to earnings in Experimental Currency Units, or ECU. 
Your entire income will first be calculated in ECU. The ECU you earn during the experiment 
will be converted to Swiss francs at the end of the experiment, according to the following 
conversion rate: 
100 ECU = 3 CHF 
At the end of today’s experiment, you will receive these earnings plus the show-up payment 
of 10 Swiss francs in cash. 
 
At no point, during or after the experiment, will you learn the identities of the people 
with whom you interact during the experiment, nor will these people learn your 
identity.
B [For Online Publication] Experimental instructions
B.1 Instructions for Part I
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The Experiment 
            
The experiment consists of several parts. At the beginning of each part you will receive 
instructions that explain that part of the experiment. The earnings that you will receive for the 
experiment consist of the sum of your earnings in the individual parts in addition to the fee 
for showing up. 
 
Part I 
Group Membership 
At the beginning of Part I, the computer will assign you at random to a group consisting of 
four participants. All interactions during Part I take place within the group to which you are 
assigned.  
Part I consists of two phases. In both phases you will make decisions related to a basic task. 
Before explaining the two phases in more detail, we first explain the basic task to you.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Basic Task 
Each of the four members of your group is endowed with 20 tokens. Each member of the 
group decides how many of the 20 tokens to put in a private account and how many to 
contribute to a group account. Any tokens you put in the private account cannot be 
contributed to the group account and vice versa. You can earn income from the private 
account as well as from the group account. 
 
Your income from the private account 
For each token you put in your private account you earn an income of one ECU. Nobody 
except you earns anything from tokens you put in your private account. 
EXAMPLE: If you put 6 tokens in your private account, you earn 6 ECU from the private 
account. 
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Your income from the group account 
For each token you contribute to the group account you and the other three group members 
each receive 0.5 ECU. Note that you will also earn income from the tokens that other group 
members contribute to the group account. For each group member the income from the group 
account will be determined as follows: 
Each group member’s income from the group account  
= 0.5 * sum of all tokens contributed to the group account 
Put differently, the total number of tokens in the group account will be doubled and then 
equally distributed among all four group members. This yields, for each group member, 0.5 
times the total number of tokens contributed. Suppose you contribute one token to the group 
account. The sum of tokens in the group account would then rise by one token. Your income 
from the group account would, thus, rise by 0.5 * 1 = 0.5 ECU. The income of each other 
group member would also rise by 0.5 ECU. So, contributing one token to the group account 
generates total income for the group of 4 * 0.5 ECU = 2 ECU.  
EXAMPLE: If the sum of tokens in the group account is 60 tokens, then you and all other 
group members each earn an income of 0.5 * 60 = 30 ECU from the group account. The total 
income for the group from the group account is 4 * 30 ECU = 120 ECU. 
 
Your total income 
Your total income equals the sum of your income from the private account and your income 
from the group account. 
Total income =  
Income from the private account + Income from the group account  =   
(20 – tokens you contribute to the group account) + (0.5 * sum of tokens in 
the group account) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Part I of the experiment consists of two phases. In the first phase you are asked to indicate 
your belief about how much the other three members of your group will, on average, 
contribute to the group account in a task identical to the one just described. In the second 
phase you are asked to decide how much you contribute to the group account in a task 
identical to the one just described.  
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a) Phase 1: Estimates of other group members’ average contributions  
In Phase 1, we ask you to estimate how many tokens the other three members in your group 
will, on average, contribute to the group account in Phase 2. Remember that each member has 
an endowment of 20 tokens and can contribute any amount from 0 to 20 tokens to the group 
account. Specifically, we ask you to provide a range of values that you believe will contain 
the average number of tokens that the other group members contribute to the group account. 
You will enter your estimate as two integers: one number for the lower end of the range and 
another for the higher end of the range.  
In Phase 2 of Part I, all group members will decide how much to actually contribute to the 
group account. We will round the actual average contribution of the other group members to 
the nearest integer, and compare it to the range you specified. You will earn ECU only if the 
actual (rounded) average contribution of others to the group account lies inside the range you 
specify. Furthermore, the wider the range you indicate the smaller are your potential earnings. 
More precisely, the exact amount you earn is calculated according to the following rules: 
• If the actual (rounded) average lies outside of the range you specify you earn 0 ECU.  
• The maximum you can earn is 20 ECU. You earn 20 ECU if you (a) specify only a 
single value – that is, if the lower number and the higher number you specify are the 
same – and (b) this value is equal to the actual (rounded) average contribution of 
others to the group account. So, for example, if you are certain that the average 
contribution of others will be 15 then you should enter 15 for both the lower number 
and the higher number. If the (rounded) average of others is actually 15 you will earn 
20 ECU. 
• As the range you specify becomes wider, you earn less money for a correct estimate. 
Specifically, for every unit that your range increases in width, your potential income 
decreases by 1 ECU. So, for example, if you enter 8 for the lower and 20 for the 
higher end of the range (i.e. your range has a width of 12) and the actual (rounded) 
average contribution of others is 14 tokens, then you will earn 20 – 12 = 8 ECU. You 
earn more than you would earn if you had entered a wider range, say from 5 to 20 
(income 20 – 15 = 5 ECU), but you earn less than you would earn if you had entered a 
narrower range, say from 10 to 15 (income 20 – 5 = 15 ECU) or if you had entered a 
range consisting only of 14 (income = 20 – 0 = 20 ECU).  
If you enter 0 for the lower end and 20 for the higher end, your range covers all possible 
average token amounts and the actual (rounded) average of others' contributions is thus 
guaranteed to lie in your range. In this case, you earn nothing (income = 20 – 20 = 0 ECU).  
To summarize, the rule is that you earn money for specifying a range that contains the actual 
average of others’ contributions,, but the amount you earn for such a correct estimate is 
smaller the wider the range you indicate.  
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b) Phase 2: “Unconditional contribution” and “contribution table” 
In the second phase of Part I, you will decide about your actual contribution to the group 
account. You have 20 tokens and you can choose to contribute any of these tokens to a group 
account. The tokens you do not contribute are put into your private account.  
In this phase, you will make two types of contribution decisions: an unconditional 
contribution decision and a decision through a contribution table. Only one of these 
decisions will count, but you will not know which one until the end of the experiment. This 
means that you should treat each one as if it is the one that determines your earnings from 
Phase 2. 
• In the unconditional contribution decision, you decide how many of the 20 tokens 
you contribute to the group account. You will enter your contribution decision as a 
single number between 0 and 20.  
• In the decision through a contribution table you may contribute different amounts 
for each possible average unconditional contribution of the other group members 
(rounded to the nearest integer). That is, you have to specify how much you want to 
contribute if the other three group members contribute, on average, 0 tokens, 1 token, 
2 tokens, etc., up to 20 tokens, to the group account. You will see a table, with all 21 
possible integer values from 0 to 20, corresponding to the possible average 
unconditional contributions made by the other three group members. 
Earnings from Part I 
After all four participants in a group have made both types of decisions in Phase 2, your 
earnings from Part I will be determined as follows.  
• First, the computer will compare the range you provided as an estimate for the other 
group members’ average contributions to their actual average unconditional 
contributions. This will determine your earnings from Phase 1. 
• Second, the computer will randomly select three group members to have their 
unconditional contributions count as their contribution decision. The computer will 
then calculate the average unconditional contribution of the three selected group 
members. This average determines how much the remaining group member will 
contribute, based on how that group member completed the contribution table.  
Together this determines the actual contributions of all four group members and, thus, 
each member’s earnings from Phase 2. 
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EXAMPLE: Assume that the three group members that were randomly selected to have their 
unconditional contributions count decided to contribute 0, 3, and 15 tokens. The average 
contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 18/3 = 6 tokens. The computer will 
then check the contribution table of the remaining group member, for the entry in the row 
corresponding to an average contribution of 6, and will use this entry to determine the 
contribution decision of this fourth group member. Suppose that this group member decided 
to contribute 10 when the average contribution by other group members is 6. Then, the 
computer will make this group member contribute 10. The total sum of contributions to the 
group account is thus 0 + 3 + 15 + 10 = 28 tokens. All group members, therefore, earn 0.5 * 
28 = 14 ECU from the group account plus their respective incomes from the private 
accounts.  
 
You will make these decisions only once in Part I. You will be informed about the 
contribution decisions of the other group members and your payoff from Part I at the end of 
the experiment, after everyone has made all decisions in the experiment. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will then come to you at your 
workplace. If not, please click “Continue” on your computer screen. 
Once we have answered all questions, we will ask you to answer some comprehension 
questions on your computer screen. These questions will ensure that everyone understands 
the instructions for Part I. 
B.2 Decision screens for Part I
Figure B.1: Beliefs about others’ contributions.
Figure B.2: Unconditional contribution decision.
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Figure B.3: Conditional contribution decision.
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Part II 
Group membership 
At the beginning of Part II, the computer will assign you at random to a group consisting of 
four participants that you have not interacted with before. This part of the experiment 
consists of 20 periods and all interactions during Part II take place with the same group 
members. In each period, you will simultaneously participate in two tasks. They will be 
displayed next to each other on the same computer screen and we will, thus, refer to these as 
Task Left and Task Right.  
For each task, you have a separate endowment of 20 tokens that you can contribute to a group 
account or put in your private account, similar to the basic task in Part I. In Part II, everyone 
will make unconditional contributions. You will enter, separately, the number of tokens you 
decide to contribute to the group account in Task Left and in Task Right.  
 
Task Left 
On the left side of the computer screen, you will decide how many of your endowment of 20 
tokens to contribute to the group account and how many to put in your private account. You 
can enter any integer from 0 to 20. Your income from Task Left is calculated in the same way 
as described for the basic task and, thus, depends on your contribution and the contributions 
of the other three members of your group. 
 
Task Right 
On the right side of the computer screen, your group will, at the beginning of each period 
(and thus before a decision in Task Left can be made), first vote on a “contribution 
threshold.” The contribution threshold specifies a minimum level of contribution to the 
group account in Task Right for each group member. The contribution threshold can be any 
value between 0 and 20.  
The contribution threshold affects the income of group members from Task Right, depending 
on whether they contribute at least as many or fewer tokens to the group account than 
specified by the contribution threshold. Specifically: 
• The income from Task Right of any group member who contributes at least as many 
tokens to the group account as specified by the contribution threshold is not affected 
by the contribution threshold. The income from Task Right is then determined as 
described for the basic task.  
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• Any group member who contributes fewer tokens to the group account than the 
minimum level specified by the contribution threshold loses any income from Task 
Right. That is, a group member that contributes less than the contribution threshold 
receives an income of 0 for Task Right, regardless of how much this group member or 
other group members contributed. Thus, there is a penalty for contributing fewer 
tokens to the group account than the contribution threshold, and the penalty is the loss 
of all income for that period in Task Right. A participant’s income in Task Left is 
not affected by anything that happens in Task Right and vice versa. Similarly, if 
one participant is penalized for contributing less than the contribution threshold in 
Task Right, the incomes of other participants are not affected. Thus, the other group 
members still benefit from any contributions made by any group member in Task 
Right. 
EXAMPLE: The contribution threshold is set to 15 in Task Right. Group member A 
contributes 5, member B 15, member C 20, and member D 20 tokens to the group account in 
Task Right. The total contributions are thus 60 tokens. Member A earns 0 ECU from Task 
Right, because he contributed less than the “contribution threshold” of 15 tokens. Member B 
earns 5 ECU from the private account plus an income of 0.5 * 60 = 30 ECU from the group 
account from Task Right. Member C and Member D earn 0 ECU from the private account 
plus 30 ECU from the group account in Task Right. Note that all group members also earn 
money based on what happens in Task Left, which is independent of Task Right. 
 
How the contribution threshold for Task Right is determined:  
At the beginning of every period, before any contribution decisions are made, all four 
members of a group vote on the contribution threshold for Task Right for that period. Every 
member votes for a desired contribution threshold, by specifying an integer value between 0 
and 20.  
The implemented contribution threshold for Task Right for that period is the lowest 
value voted for by any group member.  
EXAMPLE: Assume that group member A votes for 7, group member B for 12, group member 
C for 18, and group member D for 10. The implemented contribution threshold for Task 
Right in that period is 7, the lowest vote in the group. Any group member who contributes 
less than 7 tokens in that period in Task Right then earns 0 ECU from Task Right.  
After the voting takes place, all group members are informed about the implemented 
contribution threshold and about all of the separate votes cast by members of the group. The 
votes will be presented in descending order and it is not possible to identify which member of 
the group voted for which value of the contribution threshold.  
 
  3 
Before you make your contribution decisions in Task Left and Task Right, we will ask you 
about your belief about the other group members’ average contribution in Task Left and Task 
Right. Contrary to Part I, you will enter your (rounded) belief as a single number. So, for 
example, if you believe that the (rounded) average contribution is 12 in Task Left and 8 in 
Task Right, you should enter the numbers 12 and 8 in the respective input boxes on the 
screen. Whether your beliefs are correct or not does not impact your payoff. Please enter your 
best estimates. 
After that you will make your contribution decisions in Task Left and Task Right. 
 
Summary                 
You will make the following decisions in Part II: 
• You will vote on a contribution threshold for Task Right. The contribution threshold 
changes the potential payoffs only in Task Right. It has no effect on the payoffs from 
Task Left. 
• You will enter your beliefs about the average contribution of the other group members 
in Task Left and Task Right. 
• You will then make two contribution decisions, one in Task Left and one in Task 
Right. 
Total income in each period         
Your total income in each period is equal to the sum of your incomes in the two tasks. So, for 
example, if you earn 30 ECU from Task Left and 10 ECU from Task Right, your total 
income in that period will be 40 ECU. At the end of each period all group members will be 
informed about their incomes in Task Left and Task Right and the respective contributions of 
all group members. The contributions will be presented in descending order and it is not 
possible to identify which member of the group contributed which number of tokens to the 
group accounts in Task Left and Task Right. 
Earnings from Part II              
At the end of the experiment, one out of the twenty periods from Part II will be randomly 
selected to count for payment. Your decisions and those of your group members in that 
period will then be implemented and will determine your earnings from Part II. Specifically, 
your payoff for the randomly selected period will be multiplied by 20, so that it counts 
for all 20 periods. Note that every decision in each of the twenty periods can be relevant for 
your payoff. It is therefore important that you make your decisions in every period as if it 
would be the period that determines your actual payoff. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will then come to you at your 
workplace. Once we have answered all questions, we will ask you to answer some 
comprehension questions on your computer screen. These questions will ensure that everyone 
understands the instructions for Part II. 
B.4 Decision screens for Part II - “Endogenous institution” treatment
Figure B.4: Voting decision.
Figure B.5: Contribution decision for “PGG No Rule” and “PGG Rule”.
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